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GLOSSARY 
 
Adolescent Birth Rate (ABR): the annual number of live 
births to adolescent women per 1,000 adolescent women.1 
 
Critical Mass Goal: I define this term as the percentage of 
women who would be included in the legislature if the 
gender mandate goal were a direct predictor of actual 
election rates.   
 
Educational Difference (ED): the number of men who 
have attained some secondary school education minus the 
number of women who have attained some secondary 
school education.2 
 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM): United Nations 
index that calculates female political and economic 
opportunity.3  
 
Gender Equity Index (GEI): Social Watch index that 
measures women’s education, empowerment, and 
economic participation.4 
 
Gender Inequality Index (GII): United Nations index that 
measures gender inequality by measuring women’s health, 
education, political, and economic markers.5 
 
Gender Mainstreaming: a pluralistic approach that values 
diversity among men and women.  It aims to bring gender 
issues to the forefront of political, economic, and social 
development discussions.6 
 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI): United Nations 
index that measures gender equality change over time.7 
 
Human Development Index (HDI): United Nations index 
that measures global development in numerous 
categories.8 
Labor Force Participation Difference (LFRD): the number 
of men in the labor force minus the number of women in 
the labor force.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1"Technical Notes." United Nations Human Development 
Report. 2015. 
2 Ibid. 
3Adjei, Stephen Baffour. "Assessing Women Empowerment in 
Africa: A Critical Review of the Challenges of the Gender 
Empowerment Measure of the UNDP." Psychology and 
Developing Societies 27, no. 1 (March 2015). 
4 "Gender Equity Index (GEI).”  Social Watch. 2012. 
5“Technical Notes” 
6"Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997." UN 
News Center. September 18, 1997. 
7 “Gender Equity Index (GEI).” 
8“Technical Notes.” 
9Ibid. 
Legislated Ballot Quota: Government mandate on the 
percentage of women to be included on each party’s 
election list.10 
 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR): the number of maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births in one year.11 
 
Pro-Woman Political Reform: I define this term as 
legislation that directly benefits women, such bills that 
promote equal pay, support reproductive rights, or prevent 
gender-based violence. 
 
Quota Failure: I define this term as a quota system that 
fails to substantially increase critical mass and/or fails to 
prompt pro-woman political reform. 
 
Quota Mandate Goal: I define this term as the percentage 
of women required on a ballot under a quota system. 
 
Quota Success: I define this term as  a quota system that 
has substantially increased critical mass and has prompted 
pro-woman political reform. 
 
Real Political Power: I define this term as substantial and 
meaningful political influence measured by the resources, 
legitimacy, and political capital allocated to politicians. 
 
Reserved Seats: A quota system that mandates a minimum 
number of seats in the legislature to be reserved for female 
candidates, independent of election results.12 
 
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI): OECD 
Development Centre index that measures gender equality 
in social institutions.13 
 
Voluntary Party Quotas: Ballot quotas that are freely 
chosen by individual political parties without government 
intervention.14 
 
Zipper Policy: a ballot regulation that mandates an 
alternating order between men and women on ballots.15
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Quota Project. "About Quotas." 2009.	  
11“Technical Notes.” 
12 “Technical Notes.” 
13 "Social Institutions and Gender Index." Social Institutions and 
Gender Index (SIGI) OECD Development Centre. 2016. 
14 “About Quotas.” 
15 Freidenvall, Lenita, Drude Dahlerup, and Emil 
Johansson. Electoral Gender Quota Systems and Their 
Implementation in Europe: Update 2013. 14-15.  
	  	  
ABSTRACT 
 
Have gender quotas facilitated pro-woman reform to promote gender equality?  A wave 
of election reform in the 1990s pushed several countries worldwide to adopt legislative gender 
quotas.  These laws mandated a minimum percentage of women per party to be included on 
ballots.  A rapid adjustment in representation was expected to elevate the status of women by 
producing pro-woman political reform, such as equal pay, reproductive health, and gender-based 
violence prevention laws.  In reality, however, the results of quota laws are mixed.   
Implementation in France, Slovenia, and Belgium has been marked by successes, such as 
increased female political representation and substantial pro-woman political reform.  Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil, however, are widely regarded as quota failure countries.  This paper 
examines quota failure as a product of gender inequality.  It blends quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to deepen our understanding of how gender inequality limits female politicians’ power.  
This study ultimately concludes that quota success in a give country depends upon a high level of 
gender equality within that country. 
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PROLOGUE 
I was nineteen years old and I spent three years in prison where I was brutally tortured.  
Anyone who dares to tell the truth to interrogators compromises the lives of their 
comrades.  I am proud to say that I lied.  Lying under torture, Senator, is not easy.  I am 
proud that I lied because I saved my comrades from the same torture and from death.  In 
the face of torture, a person with dignity lies.  I fought the military dictatorship and I have 
immense pride.16 
     -Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s first female president 
 
 In May 2008, three years before assuming the presidency, Dilma Rousseff testified 
before a Senate committee about her imprisonment and torture under Brazil’s military 
dictatorship.  Her testimony, interrupted occasionally by applause from the audience, was 
charismatically masculine.  She aggressively shouted into the microphone throughout the 
majority of her speech, and aimed her comments directly at Senator José Agripino Maia, a 
former member of the Brazilian military dictatorship who had suggested that Rousseff might 
be lying about state information because she had lied under torture as a young woman. This 
testimony was a rare occurrence for now-President Rousseff.  Though Rousseff was labeled 
the “Joan of Arc” of the guerilla movement,17 she rarely discusses her youth involvement in 
leftwing groups or resisting violent interrogation.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Eu tinha 19 anos eu fiquei três anos na cadeia e quem e fui barbaramente torturada( (…) Efe qualquer pessoa 
que ousar dizer a verdade para interragadores compremete a vida dos seus iguais entrega pessoas para serem 
mortas  eu me orgulho muito de ter mentido senado porque mentir tortura não é fácil. se fala verdade diante da 
tortura quem tem coragem e dignidada fala mentira.  Eu me orgulho de ter mentido eu vim me orgulho mensalmente 
desde a mítica figura por quê eu salvei companheiros da mesma tortura e da morte (…) eu combati a ditadura 
military e disse eu tenho imenso orgulho.  
"Dilma Rousseff E a Resposta Que Demoliu O Senador Agripino Maia." 
17Brooks, Bradley.  “Ex-guerilla to Be Brazil’s First Female President.”  Yahoo News.  October 31, 2010.   
18 Romero, Simon. "Leader’s Torture in the ’70s Stirs Ghosts in Brazil." The New York Times. August 04, 2012. 
  
	  
7 
 After her youth involvement in the overthrow of the dictatorship, Rousseff remained 
active in Brazilian politics.  She was appointed to a series of positions in city and state 
governments, and was then appointed as Brazil’s Energy Minister before becoming Chief of 
Staff to President Lula.19  Rousseff’s campaign for the presidency, however, took an 
alternative path than her male predecessors.  Rather than emphasizing her tough past as a war 
hero, Rousseff’s advisors determined that she would need to heavily accentuate her feminine 
traits to gain the support of the Brazilian electorate. 
 So began Dilma Rousseff’s lengthy makeover process.  Aided by focus groups and a 
team of experts, Rousseff underwent multiple plastic surgeries to feminize the hardened look 
of her face.20   She also began to abandon what was deemed an aggressive public speaking 
tone in order to portray a softer and more feminine persona.21   This feminization process, 
described by President Rousseff’s staff as the production of a female authority, underscores 
the steep cultural barriers that female politicians in Brazil and several other countries face.  As 
a woman, Rousseff’s political toughness could actually act as a detriment to her popularity 
because it defied rigid gender expectations.22  Much of the media attention devoted to 
Rousseff ignores her decades of political experience, and is instead highly concerned with her 
ability to abide by feminine gender norms.  President Rousseff encounters practically constant 
public critique of her physical appearance, undermining her authority as a leader and 
highlighting a highly unequal gender dynamic in which men are not subject to nearly the same 
level of physical scrutiny.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19“Ex-guerilla to Be Brazil’s First Female President.” 
20 Lago, Rudolfo, and Sérgio Pardellas. "Como Construir Uma Candidata." ISTO Independente, January 21, 2009. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.	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 This double standard is a recurring theme in countries with high gender inequality.  
Female politicians, despite their qualifications, are undermined by a misogynistic environment 
that systematically limits their legitimacy and opportunity.  Interestingly, however, several of 
these countries with high gender inequality have enacted gender quota laws in an effort to 
increase female political representation.  This development begs the question: can increased 
female political representation actually promote feminist reform in a country with so little 
respect for its female leaders? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Legislated gender23 quota laws gained popularity in the late 20th century amidst a 
widespread push to enhance democratic representation.  In 1995, women held only 11.3% of 
legislative seats globally.24  Over one hundred countries have since enacted gender quotas in an 
effort to equalize political representation, appeal to female voters, and yield to pressure from 
international organizations.  Twenty years later, the global percentage of legislative seats held by 
women had doubled to an impressive 22.6%.25 
This swift improvement in female representation is notable.  The true test of quota law 
success, however, is not measured by the mere number of seats occupied by women, but rather, 
by the political and social results of this shift in representation.  Has the higher proportion of 
women in legislative office due to gender quotas facilitated feminist democracy and produced 
pro-woman reform to promote gender equality?   
There is a substantial and growing body of knowledge within political science about 
quota laws and their outcomes.  These studies generally seek to determine the relative success of 
a given country’s quota law.  Though conceptualizations of success can vary among scholars, in 
this study I will attribute quota success to two key indicators.  First, and most rudimentarily, a 
quota law must succeed in substantially increasing the percentage of women in legislative office 
in a given country.  Second, a quota law must spur meaningful pro-woman reform26 as part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The quotas discussed in this study actually address the sex of politicians, not necessarily their gender.  The term 
“gender quota” is widely used in legislation and scholarship, however, so I will use that term instead of the phrase 
“sex quotas.” 
24 Women in Parliament: 20 Years in Review. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015.  
25 Ibid. 
26 I define pro-woman reform as legislation that directly benefits women, such bills that promote equal pay, support 
reproductive rights, or prevent gender-based violence.  
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larger effort to fundamentally alter a social system that is oppressive to women.  A quota law that 
has not accomplished both of these tasks is considered a “quota failure.” 
As I will discuss in the Literature Review, most other scholars have partially attributed 
quota failure to various legal shortcomings or loopholes.  My research accepts these findings, but 
argues that there is more to quota failure than faulty legal enforcement.  Gender equality is 
actually the underlying cause of quota failure.  Using the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
which scholars have classified as quota failure countries, and Belgium, France, and Slovenia, 
which scholars have classified as quota success countries, I will disaggregate several indicators 
of gender inequality and show how each of them affect the ability for a quota to succeed or fail. 
Ultimately, I conclude that quota success in a given country is dependent on high gender 
equality within that country.  This research will use several forms of analysis to shed light on the 
relationship between gender inequality and quota failure.  
My research begins with the Literature Review.  This chapter will present the findings of 
several prominent quota scholars.  It will describe in detail the legal barriers that women face to 
gaining political power and how political parties have found ways to undermine quota laws.  The 
Literature Review will place these legal barriers in the context of gender inequality and show 
how they fit within the larger narrative of gender inequality as the explanatory variable for quota 
success. 
Chapter Two: Gender Mainstreaming and Quota Success delves deeper into the concepts 
of quota failure and quota success.  It acknowledges that “success” and “failure” are nuanced 
terms within quota scholarship, but will describe how political scientists have generally divided 
quotas into these categories.  This chapter also introduces the concept of gender mainstreaming, 
which is crucial to our understanding of quota success. In short, this chapter will tell us why 
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Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil are generally considered quota failure countries, yet Belgium, 
France, and Slovenia are generally considered quota success countries.   
Chapter Three, Methodology: a Multi-Faceted Approach lays out the framework for my 
analysis of gender inequality and quota failure.  It reiterates my initial question: has the higher 
proportion of women in office within my case studies facilitated feminist democracy and 
produced pro-woman reform to promote gender equality?  Then, it describes the various tests 
that have led me to my conclusion: quota success in a given country depends upon high gender 
equality in that country.  I include quantitative and qualitative analyses in this study to evoke a 
detailed and rich understanding of the relationship between quota failure and gender inequality.  
This section describes the methodology behind those tests, the limitations of those tests, and 
what I hope to gain from analyzing their results. 
Chapter Four, Quantitative Analysis: Measuring Real Political Power, relies on several 
quantitative tests to introduce the concept of real political power.  These tests rely the Enright 
Index, which is an index that I created to capture a baseline numerical measurement of each 
country’s gender inequality.  Using this index, I explore the relationship between gender 
inequality and critical mass in legislative bodies.  My initial findings suggested that the percent 
of women in legislative office was not necessarily related to gender inequality.  With this 
surprising discovery in mind, I sought to measure quota success not in terms of female critical 
mass, but in terms of real political power.  As Chapter Four will explain, measuring real political 
power seeks to capture women’s political influence in terms of their resources, legitimacy, and 
political capital.  Chapter Four ultimately postulates that women in quota success countries will 
have more real political power than women in quota failure countries, indicating higher gender 
equality. 
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Chapter Five, “Qualitative Analysis: ‘The Production of a Female Authority,’” takes a 
narrative approach to examining the relationship between quota failure and gender inequality.  It 
uses news media sources to create an understanding of gender inequality, reflected in 
misogynistic media portrayals of female leaders.  The importance of female sexuality is 
discussed at length in this section because female politicians are the targets of countless 
objectifying attacks in major news outlets.  These expectations reflect a society in which even the 
most powerful women are expected to adhere to traditional expectations of femininity and go to 
great lengths in pursuit of the “production of a female authority,” to maintain an appealingly 
feminine persona.  I use the varying portrayals of women in quota success and quota failure 
systems to show how women in quota failure systems tend to be subject to a greater degree of 
media sexism than those in quota failure countries.  This tendency fits into our understanding of 
gender equality as an explanatory variable of quota success. 
My research finally concludes that quota success in a given country depends upon high 
gender inequality within that country.  Slovenia, Belgium, and France’s gender quota laws have 
been largely successful because female politicians in those countries have more legitimacy, and 
the overall climate in those countries is conducive to women’s engagement in political life.  In 
contrast, women’s political power in Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina is limited by high gender 
inequality that undermines female legitimacy and opportunity.  Though my research focused on 
quota countries, these findings are widely applicable to our understanding of political 
representation in general.  Critical mass is not necessarily an indicator of legitimate 
representation, rather, indicators of real political power provide a more accurate picture of 
representation.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Literature Review: What are the Structural Barriers to Quota Success? 
 
Introduction 
 
 This section will review the substantial scholarship that already addresses quota failure.  
It explains the philosophy and history behind quota laws, and then explores several prominent 
scholars’ assessment of world quota systems.  The scholars discussed in this section generally 
conceptualize quota failure by analyzing a given law’s structural shortcomings.  My argument 
accepts that structural barriers inhibit quota success, but ultimately posits that gender inequality 
is the most important factor in prompting quota success or failure, and that structural barriers are 
actually an indicator of gender inequality in themselves.  This section establishes an 
understanding of the legal structure surrounding quotas so the rest of the paper can delve deeper 
into the broader relationship between gender inequality and quota failure.   
 
Legal Barriers to Success 
 
Numerous scholars, eager to demonstrate a link between representative political 
participation and gender equality, have studied gender quota laws.  In reality, the shift to quota 
democracy has been marked by failure, and in many cases, has not achieved its ultimate goal of 
advancing the status of women.  In fact, some quota laws have not even achieved their 
rudimentary purpose of establishing greater female representation in the first place.   
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Researchers point to several factors that cause quota law failure, including too many 
loopholes, the absence of enforcement mechanisms, party structure that is hostile to quota 
implementation, and perhaps most importantly, an overarching environment of sexism in 
political and social spheres that inhibits gender equality.  This section will discuss how each of 
these barriers have contributed to quota failure in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.   
Effective quota enforcement provisions are usually lacking in quota failure countries, and 
completely undermine the effectiveness of a quota law.  For example, Brazil lacks sufficient 
sanctioning on parties who do not abide by the quota law.27  As a result, it is common for 
political parties simply to ignore the gender quota requirement.28   Similar problems have been 
noted in Argentina and Bolivia.  This undercuts the purpose of the quota law and demonstrates a 
general lack of respect for its ideals and purposes among violating parties.  Argentina and 
Bolivia also struggled to enforce their quota laws in the early years of their implementation.  
After introducing better enforcement mechanisms, such as oversight by an election commission 
with the power to dismiss illegal lists, their quota laws have been much more successful in 
increasing the percentage of women in office. 
 In spite of modifications to ensure that party lists contain the correct percentage of female 
candidates, the Argentine, Brazilian, and Bolivian quota laws are also infamous for an abundance 
of other loopholes.   The use of family members as political placeholders is one classic example 
of a quota loophole, and is widely taken advantage of in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.  Women 
are frequently used as “puppet politicians” for male politicians who have reached their term 
limits, or for parties simply wishing to fill their quota.  As Karin Monasterios and Luis Tapia 
Mealla explain,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Miguel, Luis F. "Political Representation and Gender in Brazil: Quotas for Women and Their Impact." 2008.   
28 Osava, Mario. “Brazil: Gender Equity Suffers as Parties Flout Quota Law.”  2008. 	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When it comes to applying [the quota] one turns to one’s sisters, female cousins, 
sisters-in-law, or simply servile women of the party who will not object to the 
decisions of influential men. (…) It does not matter that they have no preparation, 
what matters is ensuring their loyalty, and in a sense their lack of understanding 
about politics, so as to perpetuate the non-interference of women in men’s 
affairs.29   
 
This method relies on women as political puppets of powerful male party leaders and limits 
women’s overall influence in the legislative agenda. 
The use of loopholes continues far beyond nepotism.  In Brazil, the passage of the quota 
law was accompanied by another law increasing the number of candidates that may be listed per 
party on a given ballot, effectively diluting the significance of female politicians included on the 
ballot.30 For example, even though women may occupy 30% of a party’s spaces on the ballot, the 
new ballot would include space for several more choices of male candidates without in turn 
adding more seats in Congress.  Under this model, male candidates are not actually replaced by 
female candidates because the higher number of male candidates on the ballot allowed men to 
maintain their seats in Congress.  
The structure and rules of political parties also cripple potential quota effectiveness.  In 
Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, politicians are tightly controlled by party agenda, leaving little 
leeway for individual candidates or other caucuses to promote alternative policies. As Deborah 
Lopreite explains, “while the number of women in legislatures was not a determining factor to 
achieve policy outcomes, party ideology was a key factor when discussing gender status 
policies.”31  In short, the presence of women in Congress does not drive policy; agendas set by 
party leaders do.  This characteristic in itself does not inherently suppress female political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Monasterios, Karin, and Luis Tapia Mealla. Partidos y participación política de las mujeres en El Alto. Centro de 
Promoción de la Mujer Gregoria Apaza, 2001 
30 "Political Representation and Gender in Brazil: Quotas for Women and Their Impact."  
"Brazil: Gender Equity Suffers as Parties Flout Quota Law.” 
31 Lopreite, Debora. "Explaining Policy Outcomes in Federal Contexts: The Politics of Reproductive Rights in 
Argentina and Mexico." 2014. 
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influence because in theory, female politicians could amass power and become influential party 
leaders, gaining the opportunity to set their party’s political agenda.  In reality, however, women 
in countries with high gender inequality rarely have access to party leadership positions.32  This 
is because female politicians generally have more limited access to vital resources, like ad space, 
campaign funding, and political advice, than their male counterparts.33 
 
Low Status of Women  
 
The idea of cultural influence on quota success appears repeatedly throughout the 
scholarship on this topic.  There seems to be general agreement that the low social status of 
women in quota failure countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia obstructs the potential 
for quota effectiveness.  A UNICEF report on the status of women in Bolivia explains that, “in 
Bolivia, a traditional misogynist culture persists where women are assigned a subordinate, 
traditional and dependent role, mainly the roles of reproduction and care of the family.”34  
Additionally, the traditional machismo culture in South America further elevates the status of 
men over women.35  This attitude permeates deeply into political culture, where women are taken 
less seriously as politicians, are expected to juggle traditional domestic duties with their political 
careers, and can face gender based violence because of their political roles.36  
It is unrealistic to expect an increase in female representation to enhance gender equality 
when those female politicians are not actually afforded the opportunity to engage fully in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. "Sustaining Gendered Practices? Power, Parties, and Elite Political 
Networks in Argentina." 2014. 
33 "Political Representation and Gender in Brazil: Quotas for Women and Their Impact."  
"Brazil: Gender Equity Suffers as Parties Flout Quota Law.” 
Costa Benavides, Jimena. "Women’s Political Participation in Bolivia: Progress and Obstacles." 2003. 
34 "The Situation of Women in Bolivia." UNICEF Bolivia. 2003. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Women’s Political Participation in Bolivia: Progress and Obstacles."   
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political realm.  Female politicians’ hands are tied in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil by quota 
loopholes, lack of quota enforcement, and party politics that systematically exclude them.  Most 
importantly, the low status of women in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil promotes general 
disrespect for female politicians and the motives of the quota laws, crippling women in the polls.  
A “quick-fix” quota law in a country with high gender inequality is unlikely to singlehandedly 
promote rapid gender equality reform and social change.  As Jimena Costa Benavides explains,  
The mere implementation of the quota law is not enough to ensure substantive 
gains in women’s political participation.  It is necessary to take steps towards the 
ideological transformations of the political system, the party system, and, 
particularly, civil society, so that women themselves change their conduct and 
expectations.37     
 
Prominent Scholarship 
 
The remainder of this chapter will explain in detail the findings of several prominent 
quota scholars.  Ultimately, these political scientists conclude that the quota systems in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil have failed to promote substantive pro-woman reform. 
 
Tricia Gray’s Scholarship: 
Tricia Gray analyzes quota failure through a structural lens.   The legal intricacies of an 
electoral system heavily affect a quota law’s ability to put more women in office.  For example, 
the use of a “closed system,” in which the party sets the order of their candidates to assume 
office, typically produces more female legislators than does an “open system,” in which elected 
officials are freely chosen by the electorate.38  Argentina and Brazil offer comparison for these 
systems.  Argentina is a closed party system, allowing greater opportunity for the government to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid.  	  
38 Gray, Tricia. “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile.” 2003. 
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heavily regulate the party list order.  Since the introduction of the quota law, female 
representation in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies has steadily risen (and surpassed the quota 
ballot mandate) to reach 37% after the last election.39  By contrast, Brazil’s open system 
Chamber of Deputies only reached 10% in the last election.40 
Though the efficacy of a closed party list is frequently cited as one of the main reasons 
for Argentina’s numerical success in putting women in office, Gray points out a few other 
characteristics of the Argentine quota law that have facilitated its numerical success.  She 
explains that under the initial implementation of the Argentine quota law, it was relatively easy 
for parties to dodge party list regulations. Because it was up to the female candidate harmed by 
the illegal list to contest the validity of the list, “such [list] challenges were often very difficult to 
carry out (…) considering the economic and political costs of challenging one's own party list.”41  
Over the years, however, the Argentine government has closed this and other loopholes.  Gray 
explains that today, the Argentine quota law is quite successful at earning women seats in 
Congress because of several of these reforms: a women must be up for legitimately electable 
positions,42 a women must be at least third on the closed party list, anyone may contest a party 
list’s validity,43 and the Argentine Attorney General has ordered federal prosecutors to take all 
actions necessary to ensure compliance with the quota law.44  If we were to measure quota 
success solely by critical mass (the number of women put in office as a result of the quota law) 
the Argentine quota law would be considered very successful, largely as a result of these 
reforms.  In fact, Argentina and Bolivia’s positive relationship with pro-quota election reform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 "Argentina." Quota Project. 
40 "Brazil." Quota Project. 
41 “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile.” 
42 As opposed to simply being alternates on a ballot. 
43 As opposed to just the harmed candidate. 
44 “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile.” 
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and high critical mass is particularly telling in comparison to Brazil’s dearth of pro-quota 
structural election reform and low critical mass.  
 There are, of course, several other vital measures of quota success, namely the results of 
increased female representation.  Examining these indicators reveals the superficiality of 
Argentina and Bolivia’s numerical quota success.  Gray begins to explain this phenomenon, and 
the rest of the scholars included in this literature review provide further analysis.  Gray describes 
a major inherent drawback to quota laws: the fact that the sheer existence of a quota will always 
undermine to some degree the legitimacy of those put in office by the quota.  She explains the 
two principal arguments against quota legitimacy, saying, “one is that merit based competition 
between women and men is the only fair and adequate means for improving women's 
representation. The other is that not enough women are willing and/or qualified to fill decision-
making roles.”45  Denise Walsh echoes this evaluation, and adds that this attitude also keeps 
women from being appointed to key party leadership positions.46 In addition, Gray describes a 
lack of feminist political organization among Argentine politicians, noting that there is “not a 
strong women’s agenda”47 within the legislature.  In spite of the Argentine quota law’s numerical 
strides in critical mass, Gray concludes that “the comparative analysis of increased female 
representation in (…) Argentina has not shown clear cut empirical evidence that more women in 
power will result in greater integration of gender issues on the public policy agenda.”48 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid. 
46 Walsh, Denise.  “A feminist approach to quotas and comparative politics.” 2013. 
47 “Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile.” 
48 Ibid. 
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Mala Htun, Marina Lacalle, and Juan Pablo Micozzi’s Scholarship: 
 Mala Htun, Marina Lacalle, and Juan Pablo Micozzi’s research is concerned with the 
legislative results of a quota-induced jump in female representation, and concurs with the 
common conclusion that quota laws do not necessarily produce pro-woman political and social 
reform.  They analyze all of the bills introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 
2007, and identified 33,272 bills, about 1.8% of the all bills introduced, as “women’s rights” 
bills.49  They also find that female politicians were generally more likely to introduce these 
women’s rights bills.50  In spite of these efforts, their research reveals that, “as women’s presence 
has grown and the process of representation has improved, the chances of successful outcomes 
have shrunk.”51  They conclude that a women’s rights bill was significantly less likely to pass 
than other bills on average,52 and that as the number of women in Congress increased, the 
likelihood that women’s rights bills would pass decreased, even adjusting for growing 
percentages of women and office.53 They conclude, “as women’s presence has grown, male 
politicians have worked harder to reduce their influence by pushing them into less important 
committees and preventing their bills from reaching the floor.”54 
 
Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo’s Scholarship: 
 Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo, two of the most prominent quota scholars, 
further explain the inverse relationship between increasing female critical mass and decreasing 
pro-woman bill approval.  Franceschet and Piscopo differentiate between legislative agenda 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Htun, Mala, Marina Lacalle, and Juan Pablo Micozzi.  “Does Women’s Presence Change Legislative Behavior?  
Evidence from Argentina, 1983-2007.” pp 106.  2013   
50 Ibid. pp. 108. 
51 Ibid. pp. 115 
52 Ibid. pp. 113. 
53 Ibid pp. 97, 115. 
54 Ibid. pp. 115.	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(bills introduced) and legislative outcomes (bills passed and the real repercussions of their 
passage).55  Similar to Htun et. al., they categorized Argentine bills introduced and followed the 
outcomes of those coded for women’s issues.  They explain, 
In examining all bills introduced in [women’s issue] areas over a 19-year period 
(1989–2007), we found that the vast majority were introduced by women (...) 
Women authored 79% of the bills on gender quotas, a category that includes the 
application of quotas to other bodies, such as the judiciary or the executive, as 
well as bills to increase the existing congressional quota from 30% to 50%. In the 
area of reproductive rights, women introduced 80% of the bills to legalize 
abortion and to expand access to contraception, and to improve reproductive 
health through education and access. In the area of violence against women, a 
category that includes all bills to enhance women’s protection from violence, 
female legislators sponsored 69% of all bills. Women also authored 73% of bills 
aimed at combating sexual harassment.56 
 
 After following the outcomes of a pro-women legislative agenda, Franceschet and 
Piscopo find that women’s issue bills were twice as likely to fail than other bills on average.57  In 
fact, of the ninety-three bills concerning reproductive health introduced between 1989 and 2007, 
only two passed.58  Overall, 1.3% of women’s rights bills were enacted into law compared to the 
Argentine lower and upper house all bill averages of 3.73% and 2.15%, respectively.59 
 Franceschet and Piscopo later discuss female politicians’ lack of legitimacy, which is a 
major contributing factor to the small likelihood that pro-woman bills—especially those 
introduced by women—will pass.   Female politicians’ perceived lack of legitimacy is largely 
perpetuated by the prevalence of nepotism in Argentine, Brazilian, and Bolivian politics, which 
have a history of using women as political puppets to meet quota mandates.  Though nepotism is 
widely practiced among male and female politicians in South America, female politicians are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Susan Franceschet and Jennifer M. Piscopo.  “Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons 
from Argentina.” pp. 398.  2008. 
56 Ibid. pp. 409-410. 
57 Ibid. pp. 416. 
58 Ibid. pp. 415-416. 
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sometimes referred to as “mujeres de…” translating to “women of…” meaning that their office 
is essentially symbolic and a female politician is the “woman of” whichever man for whom she 
is holding office (such as her husband or a party leader).60  This stereotype does have heavy basis 
in fact because appointing loyal and easily manipulated women to meet quota compliance is a 
very common practice in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.  The mujeres de stereotype, however, 
effectively plagues most women in office, even those who were elected based on their own 
merit, because it calls into question their legitimacy and undermines their political power.61  
 This legitimacy issue is not uniform throughout all quota countries.  Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, and several other developing nations opted for legislated gender quotas that quickly 
mandated the increase in female representation from a top down approach.  This mandate fueled 
internal resistance within some parties because of the rapid status quo shifts required of their 
nomination policies.62  As Franceschet and Piscopo explain of this fast-track mandated approach, 
though “descriptive representation increased rapidly, (…) [it lacked] an underlying cultural shift 
that supported women’s accumulation of political power.”63  On the other hand, some 
Scandinavian political parties adopted voluntary internal quota reform, which gradually grew 
popular among several parties.  Though more incremental, this self-driven approach allowed 
parties to maintain their autonomy and use their voluntary reform as a selling point for 
progressive voters.  This method facilitated greater internal acceptance of quota values within the 
party and produced less hostility and distrust toward female politicians.64 
 Overall, Franceshcet and Piscopo’s work helps us understand why the problem of 
legitimacy presents a major barrier to quota outcome despite a relatively strong pro-woman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. pp. 406. 
61 Ibid, pp. 403-404, 421. 
62 Ibid. pp. 404.	  
63 Ibid. pp. 421 
64 Ibid.  
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agenda produced by female politicians.   They conclude, “gender quotas cannot change the 
institutional rules and norms that govern the legislative process, meaning that quotas cannot 
guarantee improvements in substantive representation as outcome.”65   
 Though Franceschet and Piscopo’s original analysis of legislative quotas in South 
America definitively denounces quota success, they later released another paper about quota 
diffusion that suggested some modest quota success.  Quota diffusion refers to the adoption of 
quota policies as a result of the original legislated quota example.  This can result in quota 
broadening, which refers to the implementation of quotas in other areas of government (such as 
judicial appointments) or within the private sector (such as corporate boards).  It can also result 
in quota deepening, which is when legislators choose to upgrade to even more progressive quota 
laws, like when Bolivia increased their quota to 50%.66  This policy change shows a dedication 
to the “move beyond symbolic or rhetorical acceptance of women’s equality to engage in a more 
radical redistribution of power.”67  
 Franceschet and Piscopo are optimistic about the broadening and deepening of quota laws 
because they indicate mainstream “acceptance of the norm that public spaces must include 
women and the growing recognition that democracy depends on women’s equal presence.”68  
Quota diffusion promotes policy shifts to accommodate for female participation and 
demonstrates understanding that social changes must accompany political reform in order to 
bring about substantive improvements in gender equality.69  Several scholars have criticized 
legislated quota laws for their failure to address longstanding social inequities and tendency to 
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only produce superficial change.  According to Franceschet and Piscopo, quota diffusion could 
be the beginning of a new era of quota laws that seek to address the social realities necessary for 
feminist development.  
 
Teresa Sacchet’s Scholarship: 
 In her article, Beyond Numbers: the Impact of Gender Quotas in Latin America, 
published in the International Feminist Journal of Politics, Teresa Sacchet discusses more 
challenges that female politicians face in South America.  She explains, “women’s political 
participation is (…) hindered by the gender division of labour and women’s consequent domestic 
responsibilities.”70  It is difficult for women to seek out or be considered for positions of political 
power when they are also expected to be the primary caregivers for their children and maintain 
their households.  She also explains that South American female politicians are often at a 
disadvantage in terms of campaign financing because less party money is typically allotted to 
them.71  Sacchet further explores the impact of a greater female politician critical mass on the 
legislative agenda.  She explains, “an increase in the number of women in decision-making 
positions in political institutions may foster the development of a women’s coalition that can 
press for a common policy agenda, helping to create a different balance of power. (…) However, 
the size of a group is not a condition for, or guarantee of, its political influence.”72  In short, 
while increasing the percentage of women in office has the potential to enhance female political 
power, this is will not be true in all cases because other factors can limit female political power, 
even within large groups. 
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Jimena Costa de Benavides’ Scholarship: 
 Jimena Costa de Benavides’ work explores quota failure and barriers to female 
politicians’ success in Bolivia.  She notes that upon implementation, the quota law originally 
struggled because parties could fulfill the quota by listing women as alternate candidates, not 
actual candidates up for election.  Parties widely took advantage of this loophole.73  This 
problem was eventually corrected when Bolivia modified its quota law to include a gender parity 
requirement where women could not simply be used as alternates.74  Even after this modification, 
however,  discrimination against female politicians was rampant in Bolivia.  Female politicians 
faced harassment and physical violence in attempts to provoke resignation.75  Furthermore, the 
women in office frequently lacked the knowledge on legislative procedures or advisors that their 
male counterparts possessed.76  Benavides explained that Bolivian female politicians were far 
less likely than male politicians to introduce bills, and on top of that they very rarely introduced 
bills concerning women’s rights.77 
 Benavides contributes much of this quota failure to a sexist party system.  She notes that, 
“the party system is clearly a reflection of the society from which it has come; in it the politicians 
reproduce the styles and conduct of society.”78  Political parties in Bolivia are highly centralized 
around a single leader and promote traditional clientelistic relationships.  Sexism within the 
parties makes it difficult for women to gain party leadership positions, and without the 
clientelistic power that accompanies leadership, it is difficult to remain in office.  Finally, party 
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leaders are rarely involved in “women’s issue” campaigns, further limiting the opportunity for 
pro-woman bills to gain traction.79 
 Benavides aptly concludes, “the mere implementation of the Quota Law is not enough to 
ensure substantive gains in women’s political participation.  It is necessary to take steps toward 
the ideological transformations of the political system, the party system, and, particularly, civil 
society, so that women themselves change their conduct and expectations.”80 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Various scholars conclude that quotas in South America failed due to an abundance of 
loopholes, widespread nepotism, and general disrespect for the quota.  The rest of my research 
will place these, and other, factors within the larger question of gender inequality and will show 
that quota success in a given country is contingent on the status of women within that country. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Gender Mainstreaming and Quota Successes 
 
What Does Quota Success Look Like? 
  
 Recall that there are two requirements of a successful quota law: first, it must 
significantly increase female political representation; second, it must stimulate substantial pro-
woman reform.81   To significantly increase female political representation, a quota law will 
generally need to be well enforced and have certain list order regulations to ensure that the 
women on the ballot can actually be elected.  Even quota systems that do dramatically increase 
female critical mass,82 however, can still be deemed as failures in this area.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Argentine, Bolivian, and Brazilian quota laws are ridden with loopholes, which 
allow parties to put “puppet politicians” on their ballots.  These “puppet politicians,” sometimes 
known as mujeres de politicians in Latin America because they essentially represent a male 
politician, are not really legitimate leaders.  Their inclusion on party lists underscores a 
misogynistic system in which women are merely tokens, and men control true power.  Therefore, 
countries with a high prevalence of sexist nepotistic loophole usage are often considered quota 
failures, even if they have achieved superficial numerical success.   
 In addition to increasing female representation with legitimate leaders, a successful quota 
system must promote pro-woman reform.  This is measured by researching the laws that quota 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Examples of pro-woman reform include equal pay, reproductive health, and sexual assault prevention laws.   
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to critical mass as the size, amount, or number of something to produce a particular result.  This traditional Political 
Science definition conceptualizes critical mass as a definite tipping point.  For the purpose of this paper, however, I 
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countries have passed since quota implementation.  Quota success countries will have several 
laws that make significant advancements in areas such as access to women’s healthcare, 
guarantees of equal pay, or prevention of sexual assault and intimate partner violence.   
Several scholars have concluded, however, that even these political reforms are not 
enough to enact fundamental and wide reaching gender equality.  In a successful quota system, 
quotas will fit within an ambitious framework to promote gender equality in several areas of 
society.  This is part of the larger goal of gender mainstreaming.  Gender mainstreaming is a 
concept that was introduced at the 1985 Third World Conference on Women, and has become 
prominent in discussions of world development.  Gender mainstreaming can be defined as,  
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned 
action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels.  
It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an 
integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of 
policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that 
women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.  The ultimate 
goal is to achieve gender equality.83   
 
At its core, gender mainstreaming aims to bring gender issues to the forefront of political, 
economic, and social development discussions.  Gender mainstreaming is not a “quick fix” 
solution—it is the radical and intentional shift in favor of gender inequality in all aspects of 
society.  Discussions of quota success countries will frequently discuss the quota system in terms 
of gender mainstreaming. 
 The remainder of this chapter will describe several of these measures of quota success 
and explain why Slovenia, Belgium, and France are generally considered quota success 
countries, while Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil are generally considered quota failure countries.  
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Increase in Critical Mass 
Tablee 1 84 
 
The asterisk indicates the first election in which the quota law went to effect.   
 
Table1 displays female representation after five elections in France, Slovenia, and Brazil.  
We can see in all three cases that quota implementation was accompanied by a noticeable jump 
in representation, particularly in the second election after the quota law went into effect.  This 
substantial increase in female representation can probably be attributed to two factors: list 
regulation and quota enforcement. 
 
List Regulation: 
Government regulation of list order is generally a helpful tool in ensuring that female 
candidates are actually up for “winnable seats” in elections.85  If most women are placed at the 
bottom of a ballot in a PR system, it is likely that they would not be elected.   France and 
Belgium both mandate heavily regulated party lists to ensure that women are afforded an equal 
opportunity to be elected.  Belgium stipulates that the top two candidates on their lists cannot be 
of the same gender, and the rest of the list must be 50% female and 50% male.  France has a 50% 
ballot mandate “zipper policy,” meaning male and female candidates are represented equally on 
the ballot in an alternating order to ensure that one sex is not isolated to the bottom of the list.  
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Slovenia, which has a relatively recent quota law, does not currently have order regulations, 
though they do mandate than no gender may have less than 35% of the slots on each ballot.86 
 
Quota Enforcement: 
Belgium and Slovenia’s laws are both enforced by electoral authorities.  Any list that is 
presented to the election commission without fulfilling the quota requirement will be dismissed.  
Election commissions have effectively enforced this rule.  France opted for economic sanctions 
on parties that did not fulfill the requirement.  Parties who did not comply with the law would 
lose public funding proportionate to the number of members of one gender were missing from 
their list.87  Overall, this law has effectively persuaded French parties to follow the list 
regulations, though there have been a few instances where some of parties accepted a fine instead 
of completely complying with the quota on a given list.88 
In summary, Slovenia, Belgium, and France have well enforced quota laws that have 
successfully increased critical mass of female politicians.  Belgium and France’s laws also 
include strict regulation on party list order to ensure that female politicians are not isolated at the 
bottom of the lists.  Effective enforcement and regulation of the quota law is in itself an indicator 
of gender equality.  It places value on female representation, and demonstrates commitment to 
the ideal that a quota law is not window dressing, rather, a vehicle to enact substantive pro-
woman reform.  
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Quota Failure in Countries with High Critical Mass 
 
From a critical mass perspective, Slovenia, Belgium, and France far outnumber Brazil in 
terms of female representation post-quota implementation.  Brazil introduced its quota law in 
1998, after Belgium, but before France and Slovenia.  Even with nearly two decades to amass 
female representation, Brazil’s critical mass has not exceeded ten percent.  This is probably 
because Brazil does not have ballot order rules or effective enforcement mechanisms.  
Furthermore, after its quota law went into effect, Brazil expanded the number of ballot slots 
permitted on lists without expanding the number of seats in the legislature, which has minimized 
the effect of the quota provisions.89   
Argentina and Bolivia, however, have effectively increased female critical mass, like 
Slovenia, Belgium, and France.  Bolivia has adopted a zipper system like France.  Argentina’s 
list system is more loosely regulated than Bolivia, France, or Belgium’s.  According to the 
Argentine quota law, a woman must be listed in at least one of the top three places on a party list.  
Argentina and Bolivia’s substantial increases in critical mass underscore some of the structural 
strengths of their quota structure in comparison to Brazil, and to a much lesser extent, even 
Slovenia. 
In spite of some of these successes, there are still major shortcomings associated with the 
Bolivian, Argentine, and Brazilian quota laws.  Most notable is the tendency for parties to use 
mujeres de tactics in order to meet quota mandates and inflate critical mass.  As discussed 
earlier, mujeres de refers to a quota woman who “belongs” to a male politician.  She may be his 
wife, sister, other family member, or a woman who is chosen due to her unwavering party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Quota Project. "Brazil." 2015.	  
  
	  
32 
loyalty.90  These politicians may not possess the background or training necessary to make them 
viable political leaders—and the parties select them precisely for this reason.  Their token 
presence on the ballot fulfills the quota requirement without disrupting the party agenda or 
hierarchy.  This loophole is one of the main reasons why Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil have 
been classified as quota failure countries.  In contrast, scholars rarely, if ever, raise this concern 
about post-quota female politicians in France, Belgium, and Slovenia.  In fact, a University of 
London study specifically researched the qualifications of French “quota women” and concluded 
that the women in French parliament were as effective and as qualified as their male 
counterparts.91  It appears that the nepotism fueled quota dodging is not nearly as prevalent in 
these countries.   
In addition to low critical mass or prevalence of “puppet politicians,” quota failure 
countries do not enact pro-woman reform at the level that quota success countries do.  Though 
Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil have all struggled to enact substantive pro-woman reform, the 
example of Argentina is particularly telling.  As previously discussed, women’s rights bills were 
twice as likely to fail in the Argentine Congress than all bills on average.  Though Argentina has 
passed some women’s rights bills since quota implementation, Franceschet and Piscopo, who 
extensively studied bill passage data in Argentina concluded that those few laws “constitute 
neither a dramatic nor wholesale change to policy outcomes in Argentina.”92  The scarcity of 
women’s rights laws enacted after quota implementation is further evidence of quota failure. 
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Pro-Woman Reform and Gender Mainstreaming 
 
 Though there certainly are shortcomings within the Belgian, Slovenian, and French quota 
systems, the literature on these countries is laden with examples of their success.  The remainder 
of this chapter will describe some of these successes in each European case study country.  These 
“success stories” include the importance of the feminist movement in promoting and regulating 
the quota law, fundamental attitude shifts on gender equality since the implementation of the 
quota law, and pro-women legislation passed since the quota law.  These successes fit within a 
larger narrative of gender mainstreaming, indicating that each country’s quota law is part of an 
overarching movement to bring gender issues to the forefront of political and social 
development. 
 Sabine de Bethune and Els Van Hoof agree in their article “The Gender Issue in Belgian 
Party Politics and Elections,” that the Belgian quota law has been successful.  They attribute this 
success to the women’s movement within the Flemish Christian Democratic Party.  The Smet-
Tobback Act, introduced by Christian Democrats, was Belgium’s first quota law.93  Though the 
idea of a gender quota was originally met with skepticism, it quickly gained traction.  The 2002 
Belgian constitution was modified to ensure equality between men and women, and the original 
quota ballot mandate of 33% was eventually strengthened to a party rule.94  Bethune and Van 
Hoof also note that women’s movements have played a major role in Belgium’s quota success.  
They have supervised the creation of party lists to ensure that women are placed in electable 
positions and have launched major advertising campaigns urging Belgians to vote for women.95  
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The authors conclude that Belgium has included quotas as part of a widespread gender equality 
movement, and for this reason, quotas have been successful in enacting pro-woman societal 
development. 
Like Belgium, Slovenia’s quota law was also initially met with some hesitancy.  As 
Milica Antić Gaber explains in her article, “Slovenia: From Voluntary to Legislated Quotas,” 
Slovenians were generally reluctant to enact a gender quota after a history of communist rule.  A 
quota had been used previously in Slovenia, but “there was a widespread understanding that (…) 
[the women’s quota] was a mask behind which the most powerful Communist Party leaders (in 
the Central Committee) were the people who decided.”96  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a 
number of feminist groups became highly active in Slovenia, and they were crucial in integrating 
a feminist agenda into Slovenia’s post-communist modernization and democratization 
movements.  Several Slovenian political parties began to adopt their own gender quotas in the 
1990s, but female political representation remained very low compared to other European 
nations, peaking at 13%.97  In 2004, the Slovenian constitution was amended to guarantee gender 
equality before the law, and in 2006 after persistent pressure from feminist groups and the 
European Union, gender quotas earned a national mandate.98  In the ten years since its 
implementation, Slovenian female representation has surpassed its initial quota ballot mandate of 
35% to a current total of 37%,99 and its legislature has enacted several pro-woman reforms, 
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including intimate partner violence prevention laws,100 equal pay laws,101 and maternity and 
paternity leave laws.102 
 Scholars have also begun to analyze quota’s effects on political opinion.  A study 
conducted by Bram Wauters, Bart Maddens, and Gert-Jan Put in Democratic Audit analyzed 
changing political attitudes in Belgium after quota implementation.  The study found that 
opinions among the electorate and political elite gradually appeared to become more accepting of 
female politician’s legitimacy after quota introduction.  Changing opinions from party elites, 
who are historically male, is particularly important because they control campaign budgets and 
party list structure.  Wauters, Maddens, and Put concluded that since quota implementation, the 
political climate has gradually grown to be more favorable to female candidates.   
Finally, in addition to major post-quota pro-woman legal reforms such as gender based 
violence, sexual harassment, and domestic violence laws,103 France’s expansion of the quota law 
into extra-political fields exemplifies a commitment to gender mainstreaming.  France mandated 
an across the board 40% quota for corporate boards of publicly listed companies, boards of 
public institutions, chambers of commerce, and sports federations.  This action acknowledges 
that improvements in gender equality must extend beyond the political realm to be effective.104 
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Conclusions 
 
 For simplicity’s sake, I will use the terms quota success and quota failure frequently in 
this paper.  In reality, however, these terms are oversimplifications of very complex political and 
social systems.  The terms “failure” and “success” reflect frequent, overarching themes in quota 
literature that describe the general nature of quota outcomes in that country.  There are, of 
course, some examples of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Bolivian governments enacting pro-
woman reforms since the implementation of their quota laws; and there are certainly female 
politicians in those countries who have entered office without strong political ties to a male 
politician.  In spite of the successes of gender mainstreaming in Slovenia, France, and Belgium, 
some scholars have voiced concern that critical mass has not yet reached a parity, and conclude 
that there is still more to be done beyond the political realm to enhance gender equality.   
 In general, however, we can classify Slovenia, France, and Belgium as overall quota 
success stories for several reasons.  Since quota implementation, all countries have dramatically 
increased the percentage of women in legislative office due to strong enforcement mechanisms.  
There has not been extensive discussion of male-controlled female politicians in these countries, 
indicating minimal use of nepotistic manipulation as a quota loophole.  Several scholars have 
discussed the role of the women’s movement in French, Slovenian, and Belgian quota 
scholarship and have concluded that quota implementation and feminist development have gone 
hand in hand to promote fundamental enhancements in gender equality.  This partnership is 
supported by the passage of several pro-woman laws in those countries.  
 In comparison, we can generally classify Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil as quota failure 
countries.  Brazil has a very poorly regulated and enforced quota law, which has utterly failed to 
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substantially increase female political representation.  Argentina and Bolivia have successfully 
increased female representation, but, like Brazil, their political parties are infamous within quota 
literature for using mujeres de loopholes to inflate female representation.  Overall, almost all 
quota scholars who write about Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil conceptualize their quota systems 
as “quick fixes” for a massive gender inequality problem.  Though there have been some 
glimmers of improvement, Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil’s quota systems have failed to tackle 
some large gender inequality issues to the extent that quota success countries such as Slovenia, 
France, and Belgium have.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  
38 
CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology: a Multi-Faceted Approach 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Based on the conclusions of numerous political scientists, we know that quota success is 
rare.  Several academics have explored the degree of quota success by measuring the number of 
bills passed by women, the number of pro-woman bills passed by a given legislative body, and 
the number of women who wield significant political power due to the quota law.  As previously 
discussed in this paper, scholars have already classified Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil as quota 
failure countries due to their shortcomings in these areas.   Most of these studies offered 
significant insight into the structural and legal intricacies of quota laws, and then pointed out the 
loopholes in the laws that have facilitated quota failure.   
Much of the existing quota scholarship follows a common model: an inadequate legal 
framework is examined as the independent variable for the dependent variable of quota failure.  
There is, however, another very common trend among these studies: an overarching discussion 
of gender inequality.  Some scholars weave mentions of gender inequality throughout their 
articles, others reference it as a closing thought in their conclusions.  In spite of a primary focus 
on the structural and legal barriers to quota success in current quota scholarship, there is certainly 
a recurring motif of gender inequality inextricably linked to academic discussion of quota failure. 
My research accepts the conclusions of scholars such as Tricia Gray and Denise Walsh, 
who describe the structural barriers to optimal quota implementation.  This paper, however, is 
concerned with the broader topic of gender inequality as an explanation for quota failure.  In fact, 
I conceptualize the structural and legal loopholes associated with quota failure as indicators of 
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steep gender inequality in themselves.  Though quota scholars often make references to gender 
inequality, it has not yet been explored fully as the underlying cause of quota failure.  My 
research seeks to explore the relationship between gender equality and quotas.  I argue that quota 
failure goes much deeper than legal shortcomings and loopholes and conclude that widespread 
gender inequality is the root of quota failure in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.   
 
Selection of Case Studies 
 
My research relies on three primary case studies: Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, and to a 
lesser extent, three secondary case studies: Slovenia, France, and Belgium.  I chose these 
countries because they all use legislated ballot quotas and have varying degrees of gender 
inequality. 
There are several different types of quota laws worldwide.  For example, some political 
parties in various countries have voluntarily committed to gender quotas within their own parties.  
In fact, as voters began to positively respond to this commitment to more proportional 
representation, voluntary quotas often became the norm among all political parties in a given 
country.  These voluntary quotas are not legally binding, however, and were not voted into law 
by a legislative body.  Voluntary gender quotas exist in Canada, Chile, Norway, Malawi, 
Thailand, Australia, among others.105 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are countries such as Haiti, China, Kenya, Saudi 
Arabia, and Afghanistan in which a certain number of parliamentary seats are automatically 
reserved for female candidates.  These laws strictly guarantee a certain percentage of female 
representation in parliament, regardless of the outcome of an election. 	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This study focuses on the results of legislated ballot quotas.  Legislated ballot quotas 
legally guarantee that each party will include a certain percentage of women on their ballots.  It 
is not guaranteed that women will be actually elected from this ballot—the law is simply 
designed to regulate the opportunity to be elected.  Some legislated ballot countries have opted to 
strengthen ballot regulations by opting for a “zipper system,” in which male and female 
candidates alternate on the order of the ballot.106  Others have passed laws ensuring that at least 
one woman is included within the first two or three slots on the ballot.  These added regulations 
increase the chances that female candidates will actually earn a seat in parliament. 
Argentina’s constitution guarantees a 30% ballot quota for lower and upper houses of the 
nation’s federal bicameral system.107  The Argentina Justicialista party also adopted additional 
voluntary quotas of up to 50% in some provinces.108  Bolivia adopted one of Latin America’s 
most ambitious quota laws, with a 50% quota placed on its upper and lower houses at a federal 
level.  It also mandates a zipper system on parliamentary ballots.109  Brazil’s quota laws stipulate 
that the ballots for upper and lower houses at a federal level must contain a minimum of 30% and 
a maximum of 70% of candidates of each sex.  This law is not included in the Brazilian 
constitution and there are not currently any Brazilian parties with added voluntary quotas.110 
The Belgian quota law specifies that the difference between the number of candidates of 
each sex on a lower or upper house parliamentary ballot should not be more than one.  It also 
ensures that the top two candidates on a party list are not of the same sex.111  France’s 
constitution promotes equal access to political office.  Party lists for the national lower house 
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may not exceed a 2% majority of either sex on the ballot.  The difference between the numbers 
of candidates of each sex on the upper house national ballot may not exceed more than one.  
France also has a legislated zipper policy.112  Finally, Slovenia’s lower house quota law 
guarantees that no gender shall be represented by less than 35% on a party list.  Slovenia does 
not have a legislated ballot law for the upper house, but some of its political parties have adopted 
voluntary quotas.113 
The six countries included in my case study present a wide variety of ballot quota laws.  
My research originally began by questioning which type of quota law was most effective: 
voluntary party quota, legislated ballot quota, or reserved seat quota.  I also researched the ideal 
quota ballot mandate percentage.  This research, however, quickly revealed how complex the 
study of quota laws is.  The passage of a quota law in itself is virtually meaningless in countries 
where enforcement mechanisms are not equipped to bring the law to fruition.  Quota laws also 
tend to be ridden with loopholes and are magnets for political corruption.  In reality, therefore, 
one cannot simply predict quota success by the tracking the quota percentage guaranteed by law, 
or by sorting success and failure countries by quota type.  Quota law analysis must examine 
numerous variables to create an accurate picture of the role of a quota law in a given country.  
My research, therefore, seeks to establish an understanding of the status of women in each of my 
case study countries and compare it with overall quota success.  I predict that countries with 
relatively high gender equality at the time of quota implementation will generally have more 
quota success than countries with relatively low gender equality at the time of quota 
implementation.   
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Conceptualization of Analysis 
 
    I examine the independent variable of gender inequality through quantitative and 
qualitative lenses.  I use a quantitative approach as a baseline indicator of gender inequality, and 
then rely on a qualitative narrative to provide more insight into the complex cultural norms that 
influence gender inequality in each of my main case studies.   
For my quantitative analysis, I researched several indices of gender inequality.  These 
indices establish a baseline understanding of gender relations in a given country because they 
combine several well-known markers of gender inequality to produce a composite numerical 
indicator of gender inequality.  Gender indices are useful in capturing a snapshot of gender 
relations and tracking these trends over time.  There are, however, several limitations to gender 
inequality indices.  Though most indices rely on well-established indicators of gender equality, 
such as political representation, educational attainment, maternal mortality ratio, etc., it would be 
virtually impossible to take into account every single potential indicator of women’s social 
status.  There is also, of course, variation in a country’s gender inequality by region, social class, 
and ethnic group.  When it comes to gender inequality indices, therefore, we can use them to 
establish a broad understanding of women’s status on a macro level.  They are not a 
comprehensive and conclusive indicator of gender relations, rather, a foundation for further 
analysis.   
I use qualitative analysis to build upon this foundation and offer a richer explanation of 
how gender inequality creates a climate that is inhospitable to female politicians and can hinder 
quota implementation.   As I will discuss later, this qualitative analysis provides details into the 
misogynistic political systems that hyper-sexualize female politicians and belittle their power.  I 
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will show that in spite of strong critical mass increases, high gender inequality can undermine 
female legitimacy and overall quota success. 
 
Methodology of Quantitative Analysis 
 
Analysis of Current Gender Equality Indices: 
There are several well-known and credible indices of gender inequality, including the 
Gender-related Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, the Gender Equity 
Index, the Social Institutions and Gender Index, and the Gender Inequality Index.  I ultimately 
decided that none of the current gender indices would help me answer my question about the 
relationship between gender inequality and quota failure.  To answer my question about quota 
failure, an index should take women’s health, education, and labor force participation variables 
into account while separating parliamentary seats held from the data.  
The United Nations’ Gender-related Development Index (GDI) measures gender equality 
change over time as opposed to capturing independent data points for every country,114 which I 
needed for my research.  The United Nations’ Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) calculates 
opportunity for participation, but not the actual participation that may or may not result from that 
opportunity.115  There has also been significant scholarly criticism of this index because it is said 
to mask results and have data gaps. 116  Social Watch’s Gender Equity Index (GEI) focuses on 
three categories: education, economic participation, and empowerment.  It lacks any sort of 
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reproductive or maternal health component, however, which I consider an essential factor in the 
calculations of gender inequality.117  The OECD Development Centre’s Social Institutions and 
Gender Index (SIGI) seeks to measure the social institutions that can effect gender equality such 
as family code, physical integrity, ownership laws, and civil liberties.118  This measure is 
intended as a supplement to more mainstream indices of gender inequality, and is not suitable for 
an independent indication of gender inequality.   
In contrast, the United Nations’ Gender Inequality Index provides a relatively 
comprehensive range of gender equality indicators, including reproductive health, education, 
political participation, and workforce participation variables.  The Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
data is derived from the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI).  The Gender 
Inequality Index “shows the loss in potential human development due to inequality between 
female and male achievements.”119  The Gender Inequality Index exposes achievement 
disparities between women and men on a scale of zero to one.  A score of zero indicates no 
gender inequality, while a score of one indicates very high gender inequality in the areas 
captured by the GII.   It captures a simple yearly measurement of each country’s status, as 
opposed to an indicator of change over time, which allows for better multi-national comparison 
of countries on vastly differing ends of the gender inequality spectrum.  Finally, its 
measurements capture actual participation (excluding reproductive health measurements) rather 
than the mere opportunity for participation.  It quantifies gender inequality within three 
categories: health, empowerment, and labor market participation.  The health component takes 
maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rate into account.  The empowerment measure 
includes female and male populations who have attained at least a secondary education and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 “Gender Equity Index (GEI).” 
118 "Social Institutions and Gender Index." 
119 “Technical Notes.” 
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female and male parliamentary seats.  Finally, labor market participation measures male and 
female participation in the work force.  In spite of its strengths, the Gender Inequality Index 
would not be suitable for my research because it relies on women’s parliamentary representation 
as one of its variables.  Using an index that blends my independent and dependent variables 
would not be useful in explaining the relationship between gender inequality and quota success.   
 
Creation of the Enright Index: 
After considering several current gender inequality indices and noting their potential 
drawbacks, I concluded that I would need to create my own index, customized to the needs of 
my study, to best analyze my research question.  My index, entitled the Enright Index, is most 
closely related to the Gender Inequality Index in the sense that it also relies on the 2014 United 
Nations Human Development Report data120, but it excludes a parliamentary participation 
variable and corrects for some noted disadvantages in the Gender Inequality Index. 
Dr. Iñaki Permanyer explores these flaws in his paper, “A Critical Assessment of the 
UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.”  Permanyer points out that the GII’s inclusion of female 
workforce participation ignores contributions of traditional female unpaid work and promotes the 
undervaluation of these roles.  I agree that this is an important consideration, but ultimately 
support the inclusion of female market force participation because traditional female 
confinement, whether legal or social, to unpaid work is in itself an indicator of inequality.121  
Permanyer later points out that the GII calculates some variables solely in relation to women, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 I use the 2014 United Nations Human Development Report data because at the time I began this research, the 
2014 report was the most current data available.  To ensure consistency in all calculations, all quantitative data used 
in this study will be from the year 2014. 
121 Permanyer, Iñaki. "A Critical Assessment of the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index."  2013.  pp. 6. 
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while also calculating some variables that compare women and men.122  For example, maternal 
mortality ratio clearly does not include a male comparison, while the rates of secondary 
education are compared between women and men.  This imbalance can penalize low-income 
countries due to the health component.  Countries with poor overall healthcare will probably also 
have poor reproductive healthcare as a result of a widespread underfunded health system, not 
necessarily as a result of gender inequality.  While low overall development scores are balanced 
in the areas with a male to female comparison, the variables included in the health section do not 
allow for comparison to men’s healthcare.  This generally skews two components of the overall 
GII score, maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rate, in the favor of countries with highly 
functioning and well-funded healthcare systems without actually taking into account the health 
related gender inequality present in a given country.  Most importantly, Permanyer concludes 
that the GII is unnecessarily complicated and confusing and could be improved by using a 
simpler formula to generate its values.123 
 
Calculating the Enright Index: 
I derived all of my data for the Enright index from the United Nation’s Human 
Development Database and created a dataset of each country’s maternal mortality ratio, 
adolescent birth rate, difference between men and women who have attained at least some 
secondary education, and difference between men’s and women’s labor force participation.  
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in one 
year.  Maternal death is defined as a female death from any cause related to or aggravated by 
pregnancy or its management during pregnancy and childbirth or within forty-two days of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid. pp. 1.	  
123 Ibid. 
  
	  
47 
termination of pregnancy.124  Maternal death is most commonly caused by postpartum bleeding 
or complications from unsafe abortion.125  A low maternal mortality ratio, therefore, is regarded 
as a strong marker of high gender equality because it generally indicates societal value placed on 
women’s healthcare, including access to safe and legal abortion.   
Adolescent birth rate refers to the annual number of live births to adolescent women per 
1,000 adolescent women.  An adolescent woman is defined as any woman between the ages of 
fifteen and nineteen.126  Low adolescent birth rate is also regarded as an indicator of high gender 
equality because it demonstrates women’s autonomy.  Low adolescent birth rate can indicate 
effective sex education, access to contraception and abortion, and the ability for women to 
choose when (or if) they would like to marry and/or have children.  I acknowledge Permanyer’s 
point that including reproductive health markers in gender equality indices can mathematically 
penalize poor countries with limited healthcare resources.  I argue, however, that maternal 
mortality ratio and adolescent birth rate are crucial indicators of women’s autonomy and 
opportunity, and warrant inclusion in discussion of the global status of women.  
My educational attainment variable relies on the percentage of women who enter 
secondary school compared to the percentage of men who enter secondary school secondary 
education.  I subtract the percentage of women who have entered secondary school from the 
percentage of men who have entered secondary school.  In most cases, this produces a positive 
value, indicating that higher percentages of men attain at least some secondary education than 
women. Calculating the difference between these percentages corrects a bias in favor of 
wealthier countries with more educational resources as opposed to simply using the percentage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 "Millennium Development Goals Indicators." United Nations Statistics Division. 
125 Murray, Christopher. "Global, Regional, and National Age-sex Specific All-cause and Cause-specific Mortality 
for 240 Causes of Death, 1990-2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013." 2015.	  
126 "Human Development Reports." Adolescent Birth Rate (women Aged 15-19 Years).  United Nations.  2015. 
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of women who attain at least some secondary education without factoring in men.  For example, 
in the Netherlands, 87.7% of women attain at least some secondary education, while 90.5% of 
men attain at least some level of secondary education.  In comparison, access to education for 
both men and women is far more limited in Venezuela than the Netherlands.  Interestingly, 
however, 56.6% of Venezuelan women attain some level of secondary education while 50.8% of 
Venezuelan men attain some level of secondary education.  This leaves the Netherlands with a 
raw score of 2.8% in this category and rewards Venezuela a raw score of -5.8%.  Even though 
there is less overall access to secondary education in Venezuela than in the Netherlands, 
Venezuela outperforms the Netherlands in this measurement because they have a negative 
difference between the number of women and men who attain some level of secondary 
education. 
In a similar manner, my labor force participation variable also relies upon the difference 
between men and women participating in the labor force.  Labor force participation rate refers to 
the proportion of a country’s population, age fifteen and older, that engages in work or is actively 
seeking work127.  The difference between male and female labor force participation rate is a 
helpful indicator of gender inequality because it can demonstrate the degree to which women 
have the freedom to seek work outside the home, earn an income, and gain financial stability.  
All countries except Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, and Burundi had higher male labor force 
participation than female labor force participation.    
My index does not include female parliamentary participation, like several other indices, 
because this would distort my research.  In fact, as I will ultimately conclude in this paper, the 
mere percentage of women in office is not necessarily a true indicator of gender equality due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 "Human Development Reports." Labour Force Participation Rate (female-male Ratio). United Nations.  2015. 
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several potentially confounding variables, such as nepotism, corruption, and disrespect for quota 
values, which undermine real female political agency. 
As we can see below with Tables 2 and 3, removing female parliamentary representation 
from a gender inequality measurement affects gender inequality measurement.   
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Table 2 
United Nations Gender Inequality Index ranking of case study countries 2014: 
Country: GII Rank % female parliament seats 
Slovenia 1 27.2% 
Belgium 8 42.4% 
France 13 25.7% 
Argentina 75 36.8% 
Bolivia 94 51.8% 
Brazil 97 9.6% 
 
 
Table 3 
Enright Index: 
Country: Index Rank % female parliament seats 
Slovenia 10 27.2% 
France 28 25.7% 
Belgium 31 42.4% 
Brazil 77 9.6% 
Argentina 84 36.8% 
Bolivia 114 51.8% 
 
 The new index reflects shifts in the order of all of my case study countries when 
percentage of women in office after quota law implementation is removed from the 
measurement.  We can even see that Bolivia and Brazil, the countries with the highest and lowest 
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percentages of women in parliamentary office in my case study, shifted positions drastically.  
Bolivia may have impressively high female representation, but its very poor performance in the 
reproductive health measures compared to Brazil’s relative success lowers its ranking under my 
measurement. 
 My index also responds to one of Permanyer’s key criticisms in the sense that it is a 
much simpler calculation.  The Gender Inequality Index uses a complex mathematical formula 
that generates a numerical value for gender inequality on a scale of negative one to one.  My 
research, however, is more concerned with each country’s relative gender inequality compared to 
average global gender inequality.  It does not attempt to specifically quantify each country’s 
exact value of gender inequality.  Rather, it shows each country’s gender inequality—based on 
four key markers—compared to global average gender inequality.  This is accomplished using z-
scores, where a score of zero indicates the mean gender inequality for all countries.128  Each 
country’s z-score, therefore, reflects a country’s distance in standard deviations from the global 
gender inequality mean.  A negative z-score on my index reflects lower than average gender 
inequality.  A positive z-score on my index reflects higher than average gender inequality.   
 I will demonstrate this calculation below with Table 4 using the example of Norway, the 
highest-ranking country on my  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 160 countries were used in this study as opposed to 196 because some very small countries did not have enough 
data to be included in the UN Human Development Report database.  All countries that had reported values for 
Maternal Mortality Ratio, Adolescent Birth Rate, attainment of at least some secondary education, and labor force 
participation were included in this study. 
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Table 4 
Norway Raw Scores 
Maternal Mortality Ratio 4 
Adolescent Birth Rate 7.8 
Difference between female and male population 
with some secondary education 
96.7 (male)-97.4 (female)= -0.614 
Difference between female and male labor force 
participation 
68.7 (male)-61.2 (female)= 7.5 
 
 
Norway z-scores 
Maternal Mortality Ratio -0.7367 
Adolescent Birth Rate -1.0113 
Difference between female and male population 
with some secondary education 
-0.739 
Difference between female and male labor force 
participation 
-0.9505 
 
 
-0.7367 + -1.0113 +-0.739 + -0.9505 = -3.437 
-3.437/4 (because there are four categories)   = -0.8594 
Norway’s final index score: -0.8594 
 This index score tells us that Norway is -0.8594 standard deviations away from the 
average global inequality score when we measure inequality using the four quantitative markers 
in this study. Because a score of zero indicates the global average of gender inequality, Norway’s 
negative score is well below the average world gender inequality. 
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Applying the Enright Index: 
 In the next chapter, I will compare the Enright Index’s baseline measurement of gender 
inequality to various markers of quota success to assess gender inequality’s effect on quota 
implementation.  I begin by comparing Enright Index scores with critical mass percentages of 
women in legislative office.  The data on female political representation is also taken from the 
2014 United Nations Human Development Report dataset.  I chose to begin my quantitative 
analysis by comparing the Enright Index with each country’s female legislator critical mass, and 
seeks to answer the question, “do countries with more women in legislative office have lower 
gender inequality?”  This comparison takes data from all countries included in the Enright Index 
into account, not just quota countries.  I chose to compare all countries because most countries 
do have some sort of ballot quota, and a larger sample size would create a fuller picture of the 
relationship between gender inequality and the larger issue of female representation.  Female 
representation, of course, is what quota laws seek to address.     
 Later, I gather party leadership data from all six of my case study countries.  I gathered 
this data from CIA World Factbooks, which list major political parties and their leaders each 
year.  I chose to compare the number of male and female party leaders per each country, with the 
prediction that quota success countries would have higher female leadership than quota success 
countries—indicating a higher degree of power for female politicians beyond the quota driven 
critical mass increases.    
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Methodology of Qualitative Analysis 
 
Conceptualization of Analysis: 
As discussed earlier, the Enright Index used as quantitative analysis in this study provides 
the foundation for further in depth cultural exploration of women’s status in my case study 
countries.  I rely on qualitative analysis to enhance understanding of the status of women in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, and to explain how this status affects quota success.  The 
qualitative analysis explains why female politicians in quota countries can lack legitimacy. 
Perhaps the most substantial criticism of quota reform is that it does not promote true 
legitimacy of female candidates.  “Quota women” can become placeholders for the male leaders 
who truly hold power.  Women in office can be perceived as less deserving of respect than their 
male counterparts because unlike women, men did not directly benefit from quota assistance 
during their campaigns.  Rather than radically shifting gender norms through changes in political 
representation, quota laws in countries with high gender inequality tend to shed light on the 
oppressive barriers that women face in the struggle to amass political power. 
One clear marker or gender inequality is the near constant expectation of feminine beauty 
for female politicians.  Female politicians undergo a level of physical scrutiny that would be 
unheard of for their male counterparts.  While media attention for male candidates is largely 
centered upon their professional experience and political successes or shortcomings, I argue that 
female politicians in countries with high gender inequality will encounter frequent media 
objectification rooted in sexism. 
I use numerous media sources to establish an understanding of each country’s tendencies 
in describing their female politicians.  All of my sources are published in the country to which 
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the female politician belongs.  This ensures that the inferences made from the publication reflect 
upon the norms of the country in question.  All of my sources are major news outlets, as opposed 
to beauty magazines.  The fact that several major publications often devote press coverage to 
analyzing female politicians’—but not male politicians’—beauty regimes is telling of the sexist 
double standard that women face.   
I gathered these media sources by searching news databases in all six of my case study 
countries.  I chose to research the highest-ranking female politicians in each country.  Dilma 
Rousseff is the current president of Brazil. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was the president of 
Argentina between 2007 and 2015. Gabriela Montaño Viaña is the current president of the 
Bolivian Senate and Betty Asunta Tejada Soruco is the current president of the Bolivian 
Chamber of Deputies.129  Christine Defraigne is the current President of the Belgian Senate. 
Édith Cresson was the Prime Minister of France from 1991 to 1992.  Alenka Bratušek was the 
Prime Minister of Slovenia from 2013 to 2014.   I searched news databases with each politician’s 
name and the phrases for “fashion,” “plastic surgery,” “makeup,” and “weight.”  I chose these 
phrases because they reflect a set of feminine expectations unrelated to traditional political 
power.   
This form of research veers away slightly from legislative quota examination in the sense 
that it analyzes the highest ranking female politician in each country, some of whom are 
members of the executive branch, as opposed to a narrowly tailored focus on female leadership 
in legislative bodies.  This is because my news media analysis seeks to examine the independent 
variable of gender inequality as a whole, not just attitudes toward quota elected women the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 There has been one female president in Bolivia.  Lidia Gueiler Tejada was an interim president between 1979 and 
1980.  She was quickly overthrown in a military coup led by her cousin in 1980.  Though she technically has been 
the highest-ranking female Bolivian politician, I chose not to use her for my analysis because she was president long 
before the quota law went into effect and was only in office for a very brief period. 
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legislature.  I assumed that the highest-ranking female politician in each country would generally 
have some of the strongest qualifications and backgrounds in politics, correcting for most 
“warranted” media criticism of her legitimacy as a leader.  I also chose to focus on the each 
country’s highest ranking female politician because I assumed that there would be a great deal of 
press coverage devoted to her, allowing the most samples for my qualitative study.  My research 
assumes that widespread and frequent misogynistic media attention toward a country’s highest 
ranking female politician is indicative of pervasive gender inequality throughout that country, 
which in turn directly affects the legitimacy of female politicians in legislative bodies. 
 
Brazil and Argentina: 
The search with these terms in Brazilian and Argentine news sources combined with the 
terms “Dilma Rousseff” and “Cristina Fernández de Kirchner,” respectively, revealed numerous 
articles.  It was very common to find articles that intimately discussed the politicians’ weight 
gain, attractiveness, or sexuality without any mention of their policy agenda.  I will closely 
analyze several of these selected sources later in this paper by examining their wording and 
imagery within the larger framework of sexist obstacles to female political power.  I also ran 
similar searches for high-ranking Brazilian and Argentine male politicians.  Predictably, this 
search yielded hardly any relevant results. 
This is certainly not to say that most media interpretations of Rousseff and Kirchner seek 
to undermine their authority through misogynistic objectification.  In fact, the majority of articles 
I found on both politicians did not address their physical appearance or feminine qualities.  
Analyzing several of the readily accessible articles that do address the feminine beauty 
expectations that female politicians encounter, however, is helpful in explaining the political 
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culture of Argentina and Brazil.   This political culture that so harshly pushes female politicians 
to adhere to an objectifying feminine norm is indicative of a society that can tend to undervalue 
women and undermine their power. 
 
Bolivia: 
The same test for Gabriela Montaño Viaña the current president of the Bolivian Senate 
and Betty Asunta Tejada Soruco, the current president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies was 
far less fruitful.  There were not any relevant results after searching these terms in Bolivian news 
sources with either politician’s name.  Upon further investigation, I learned that this shortage of 
results was not necessarily due to a lack of feminine beauty expectations in Bolivian politics.  On 
the contrary, it is because hardly any media attention at all is devoted to either woman.  Though 
Viaña and Soruco both have brief biographies on a Bolivian government website, the press 
coverage devoted to them is limited to scarce and brief mentions in the occasional news article.  
In contrast, there are several other lower-ranking Bolivian male politicians who are featured 
quite regularly in the press.   
Though the absence of information on Bolivian female politicians does not lend itself to 
my initial exploration of feminine beauty expectations, it is still very telling of gender inequality 
in Bolivia.  Two of the highest-ranking government officials in Bolivia, who happen to be 
women, receive far less press coverage than lower-ranking male politicians.  This indicates less 
overall interest in their agendas and limits their public voices.  Though most of my qualitative 
study will center upon the beauty expectations of Argentine and Brazilian female politicians, it is 
important to keep in mind that the absence of media coverage on Bolivian female politicians is 
also indicative of underlying sexism. 
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Discussion of Selection Bias 
 
 Finally, it is important to acknowledge an understanding of selection bias in this study.  
My case study selection was intentional because I was seeking to explore successful and 
unsuccessful legislated quota countries with a broad range of gender inequality scores.  I 
strategically chose Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Belgium, France, and Slovenia to allow me to 
examine a range of quota successes and failures.  As Robert Alford, Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba explain in their book, Designing Social Inquiry,  
Usually, selection must be done in an intentional fashion, consistent with our 
research objectives and strategy.  Intentional selection of observations implies that 
we know in advance the values of at least some of the relevant variables, and the 
random selection of variables is ruled out.130   
 
 My research seeks to unpack the relationship between gender inequality and quota 
failure, with gender inequality as an explanatory variable for quota failure.  I accept the previous 
scholarship that categorizes Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil as quota failure countries while 
classifying Belgium, Slovenia, and France as quota success countries.  I explain the dependent 
variable of quota failure by analyzing gender inequality, which is the independent variable, in 
each of my case study countries.  A pre-determined dependent variable is generally problematic 
in an academic study.  In the case of this study, however, previous scholarship had already 
classified my dependent variables.  My research seeks to explore how my independent variable 
affects the dependent variable through a series of quantitative and qualitative studies.  It adds 
more variation to the independent variable and offers a richer and fuller understanding of a 
relationship that other scholars have already begun to explore.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 “Alford, Robert R., Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. "Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research." 1995.  pp. 132. 
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Conclusions 
 
 This section explains the methodology behind my quantitative and qualitative 
approaches.  My quantitative analysis relies upon the Enright Index, which seeks to create a 
baseline indicator of gender inequality.  I then use the Enright Index for other quantitative 
comparisons to draw some conclusions about the relationship between gender inequality and 
quota laws in each of my case study countries.  These findings are further explored in my 
qualitative research, which compares news media discussion of female political leaders to 
describe how gender inequality can limit the female politicians’ legitimacy.   	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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Quantitative Analysis: Measuring Real Political Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 
 This section explores the relationship between quota success and gender inequality 
through a quantitative lens.  I analyze the relationship between gender inequality and share of 
female seats in parliament, and then further analyze substantive female legislative power by 
examining the number of women with party leadership roles in each case study country since 
quota implementation.  I will discuss the limitations to these measurements, but ultimately show 
how these markers help to establish a basic understanding of the relationship between quota laws 
and gender inequality. 
 
Hypotheses and Conceptualization 
 
 This section relies on measurements from the Enright Index, which measures gender 
inequality without taking female political representation into account.  I argue that for a quota 
law to be successful in a given country, there must be a high level of gender equality within that 
country.  This pre-existing gender equality allows female politicians to be valued and respected, 
permitting them to promote their agendas and amass political power by gaining leadership roles.  
Without this pre-existing equality, female politicians can simply be ushered into office via the 
quota law without having real legitimacy or power.  High gender inequality can cause a lack of 
respect for female politicians, which essentially renders a quota law useless because female 
politicians will lack decision making power and voice.  The Enright Index seeks to capture a 
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very basic measurement of each country’s gender inequality so it can be compared with quota 
success.  The Enright Index uses z-scores to compare all countries’ gender inequality with the 
global mean gender inequality.  Table 5 displays all of my case study countries’ Enright Index 
scores, the components that helped to determine those scores, and their ranking compared to all 
other countries included in the index.  The entire dataset with all world countries can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
Table 5 
Case Study Countries’ Enright Index Scores 
Country Maternal 
Mortality 
Ratio 
Adolescent 
Birth Rate 
Education 
Difference 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Difference 
Enright 
Index Score 
Enright 
Index World 
Rank 
Slovenia 7 0.6 2.250 10.9 -0.752 10 
France 12 5.7 5.195 10.9 -0.622 28 
Belgium 6 6.7 5.378 11.8 -0.603 31 
Brazil 69 70.8 -2.216 21.4 -0.221 77 
Argentina 69 54.4 1.280 27.5 -0.109 84 
Bolivia 200 71.9 11.502 16.7 0.292 114 
*Recall that a negative score indicates lower than average gender inequality, while a positive score indicates higher 
than average gender inequality. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates roughly how these scores are distributed, indicating the frequency that 
certain Enright Index scores appeared after calculating the aggregate components of the index. 
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Figure 1 
Frequency of Enright Index Scores 
 
*Recall that under the measurements in the Enright Index, a negative score 
indicates below average inequality, while a positive score indicates above 
average inequality. 
 
I also use the measurements gathered in the Enright Index to compare gender inequality 
with female political representation.  Because female politicians, especially in quota countries, 
frequently face formidable barriers to gaining prominent political power even if they hold office, 
I predicted that gender inequality and share of female seats in the legislature would not strictly 
correlate.  As several scholars have already determined, various quota countries have 
successfully increased critical mass of female legislators without actually enacting pro-woman 
reform and without affecting gender equality. 
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H1: There will be no clear relationship between gender inequality and number of female 
held seats in the legislature. 
The true question when it comes to quota success is not the critical mass, but rather the 
real power that female politicians hold in office—which is dependent on gender equality.  I 
define real political power as substantial and meaningful political influence measured by the 
resources, legitimacy, and political capital allocated to politicians.  I sought to capture this more 
complex measurement of real power by examining the number of female political party leaders 
in each country.  I predicted Belgium, France, and Slovenia—which scholars have classified as 
quota successes—would have a very high number of female party leaders, indicating substantial 
resources, legitimacy and political capital allocated to female politicians.  I also expected 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil—which scholars have classified as quota failures—to have very 
few female party leaders, indicating a fewer resources, legitimacy, and political capital allocated 
to female politicians. 
H2:  Quota success countries will have a much greater number of female party leaders 
than quota failure countries. 
 
Relationship between Enright Index and Female Seats in Parliament 
 
 Based on the work of the scholars discussed in the Literature Review, we know that a 
quota law does not automatically increase female representation in a legislative body.  As we’ve 
seen in the cases of the quota failure countries discussed earlier--Brazil in particular--loopholes, 
faulty enforcement mechanisms, and lack of party support can inhibit a quota law from 
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increasing the critical mass of women in office.  Quota countries will not necessarily achieve 
their goal of increasing critical mass or prompting pro-woman political reform.   
As we see below in Table 6, my case study countries have had varying success in their 
ability to meet or exceed ballot critical mass goals.  I equate critical mass goals with the quota 
ballot mandate percentages.131  
Table 6132 
Case Study Countries’ Quota Mandates and Female Representation 
Case study country Year quota began Quota ballot mandate 2014 % of female held seats  
Argentina 1991 30% 36.8% 
Bolivia 1997 50% 51.8% 
Brazil 1998 30% 9.6% 
Belgium 1994 ~50% 42.4% 
France 2000 48%-52% 25.7% 
Slovenia 2006 35% for lower house only 27.2% 
 
 Brazilian women only occupy 9.6% of congressional seats while their ballot stipulates 
30% inclusion of female candidates on ballots.  This divergence can probably be attributed to 
Brazil’s very poor quota law enforcement mechanisms.  France, Belgium, and Slovenia have 
notably higher percentages of women in office, but have still not met the critical mass goal 
expressed in their ballot regulations.  France, Belgium, and Slovenia all have relatively strong 
quota laws with adequate enforcement mechanisms.  A poorly structured quota law, therefore, is 
probably not to blame for the relative lag in female representation compared to their quota ballot 
mandates.  Argentina and Bolivia, which have both gradually increased quota enforcement 
mechanisms and eliminated several loopholes, have exceeded their quota ballot mandates in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 At their core, quota laws are meant to increase ballot access for women—not necessarily actual critical mass.  
Most scholars agree, however, that the ability of a quota to increase female critical mass is a key marker of quota 
success.  For this reason, I define a given country’s critical mass goal as the same number as that country’s quota 
ballot mandate.  For example, Argentina has a 30% quota mandated ballot minimum, so under my definition, their 
critical mass goal would also be 30%. 
132 “Technical Notes.” Quota Project. "About Quotas."	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critical mass.  This development suggests that well enforced quota laws with few loopholes can, 
with time, effectively increase female critical mass in Parliament.  
 As discussed earlier in this paper, however, this increase in critical mass does not 
necessarily lead to pro-woman political reform.  In fact, after reviewing the work of several 
scholars, I became skeptical that the number of women in office (quota mandated or otherwise) 
was indicative of a given country’s gender equality.  If the number of women in office directly 
impacted gender equality, we would generally expect countries with high rates of female 
political representation to have low gender inequality.  This relationship is key to understanding 
quota laws because countries with well-implemented quota laws often have relatively high 
female political representation.  We know, however, that the superficial numerical success of 
increased female critical mass due to quotas may include under qualified, easily manipulated, 
mujeres de politicians.  These female politicians may not have true power or authority.   
With this reality in mind, I predicted that gender inequality (as measured by the Enright 
Index) would not strongly correlate with the number of female seats in a country’s legislative 
body.  As we see in Figure 2, this hypothesis was correct. 
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Figure 2 
Relationship between Enright Index and Share of Seats in Parliament 
(2014)133 
 
 This scatter plot displays the percentage of 2014 female seats in parliament for all 
countries worldwide with their Enright Index score.  This plot has a slight negative trend with a  
-.011 linear regression line slope.  This slight negative trend means that countries with a higher 
share of female seats in parliament were generally somewhat more likely to have a lower Enright 
Index inequality score (indicating lower gender inequality).   
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 Overall, however, this plot is widely dispersed without any strong correlation between 
share of seats in parliament and gender inequality.  Conventional wisdom might tell us that a 
high number of female elected officials would correlate strongly with high gender equality, but 
this graph indicates that the share of female held legislative seats has little relation with a 
country’s gender inequality.   
 Below, Figure 3 adds country labels to this scatter plot.  The case study country plots are 
highlighted in red. 
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Figure 3 
Relationship between Enright Index and Share of Female Seats in Parliament (all 
countries displayed)134 
 
 I circled a large cluster of points on this scatter plot to emphasize that there are several 
countries with less than twenty percent of female held seats and a below average gender 
inequality measurement.  The United States is included in this group, with 19% of federal 
congressional seats held by women in 2014.  The case study countries are widely distributed 
across this plot.  We can see that Brazil is included in the cluster of countries with few female 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 “Technical Notes.” 
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legislators (9%) and below average gender inequality (-0.22).  Slovenia, Belgium, and France all 
have Enright Index scores below -0.6, well below average gender inequality scores.  Of those 
countries, Belgium falls furthest to the right due to its high percentage of female parliamentary 
representation at 42%.  Slovenia and France lag slightly behind this percentage at 27% and 25% 
female representation, respectively.  Argentina has a relatively high rate of female parliamentary 
representation (36%), and has slightly lower than average gender inequality (-0.1).  Bolivia’s plot 
falls in the upper right area of this scatter plot because it has very high female legislative 
representation at 51%, accompanied by a high Enright Index gender inequality score of  .29, 
indicating above average gender inequality.  Overall, this scatter plot supports my hypothesis 
that gender inequality does not strongly correlate with share of female seats in parliament. 
 When considering quota success, one cannot immediately consider high female critical 
mass an indicator of success nor gender equality.  Female politicians face numerous barriers to 
amassing real political power. 
 
Relationship between Gender Inequality and Party Leadership 
 
 With this distinction between critical mass and gender inequality in mind, I sought to 
examine the relationship between quotas and real female political power.  We know that a mere 
seat in the legislature does not necessarily equate to real political power.  Leadership of a 
prominent political party, however, would indicate real political power.  As discussed earlier in 
the Literature Review, political parties heavily influence agenda and political hierarchies in all 
six of my case study countries.  Party leaders create platforms and oversee allocation of 
campaign resources.  For this reason, a party leader has a great deal of power over who is elected 
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and which policies will be pursued.  I suspected that countries that have been categorized by 
scholars as quota successes would have several female party leaders, indicating real political 
power, while quota failure countries would have fewer female party leaders, underscoring the 
potential for quota women to become political puppets. 
 This hypothesis proved somewhat true.  Table 7 represents party leadership from the year 
that a quota was implemented in each case study country to 2015.  These lists of party leaders 
were gathered from annual CIA Factbooks, which included a list of all prominent political 
parties in existence that year and their leader(s).  My case study countries have multi-party 
systems, meaning the party divisions and their leaders could shift every year.  
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Table 7 
Female Political Party Leaders in South American Case Studies135
 
 
 This table shows party leadership since quota implementation.  The data for each country 
begins at the year their quota law was implemented.  The right-hand column for each country 
shows the number of major party leaders that year, as determined by the CIA World Factbook, 
and the left-hand column for each country tells us how many of those party leaders were female.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 "CIA World Factbooks." Central Intelligence Agency. 1991-2015. 
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The number of political party leaders in every fluctuates annually as party coalitions merge and 
shift.   
 This table indicates that, in spite of quota driven increases in female representation, very 
few female politicians in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil actually became party leaders.  
Argentina’s female party leadership is notably larger than Bolivia or Brazil’s, but it took ten after 
quota implementation for a woman to become a party leader.  Since that time, yearly Argentine 
female party leadership numbers have remained modest.  In comparison, however, Bolivia and 
Brazil have far lower numbers with only five female party leaders each over several years of 
quota implementation.  This overall imbalance of power is highly indicative of a political climate 
that does not value female leadership as much as male leadership.  Party leaders wield 
substantive political decision making power, and becoming a party leader requires a high degree 
of political capital and respect.   Argentine, Bolivian, and Brazilian women may have gained 
seats in office through the quota law, but overall, they have not entered into the prominent and 
powerful party leader spaces.  This finding supports the research of other authors who have 
concluded that a seat in office does not grant a woman substantive political power.  It will be 
very difficult for women to gain political power in a system that does not value female 
leadership. 
 Bolivia, in particular exemplifies this phenomenon.  Bolivia’s legislature is now over 
fifty percent female, yet they have only had five female party leaders between 1997 and 2015.  
The heavy female representation in Bolivian legislature provided ample candidates for female 
party leadership, yet male leaders still disproportionately dominated party leadership—and 
political decision-making power.  This discrepancy indicates high gender inequality, and has 
surely inhibited true quota success.  While Bolivia has been very successful in reforming quota 
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loopholes and increasing critical mass, their quota law is still classified as a failure by several 
scholars.  These finding support that conclusion, and shed light on how gender inequality in 
Bolivia has inhibited quota success.  
 Below, Table 8 shows the same information gathered about Slovenia, Belgium, and 
France. 
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Table 8 
Female Political Party Leaders in European Case Studies136 
 
 Like the previous table, Table 8 displays party leadership in France, Belgium, and 
Slovenia since their quota implementations.  This chart shows that Belgium and France have had 
several more female party leaders than Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.  Slovenia’s female party 
leadership, though still higher than Bolivia and Brazil, is lower than female leadership numbers 
in France, Belgium, and Argentina.  This can probably be attributed to the fact that Slovenia’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 "CIA World Factbooks." Central Intelligence Agency. 1991-2015. 
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2006 quota is relatively recent and there are fewer post-quota yearly data reports to add to their 
total.  These leadership roles indicate more power and respect for female political leaders in 
these countries than in the South American countries.  Still, for countries that have been 
overwhelmingly classified as quota successes by scholars, I was expecting a much higher 
prevalence of female leadership.  Though these numbers certainly indicate more female 
leadership than exists in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, this measurement does not contribute to 
the classification of France, Slovenia, and Belgium as quota success countries.  There is still a 
large discrepancy between male and female party leadership, indicating an imbalance of power 
and lower value placed on female leadership than male leadership.   
 Scholars have classified Slovenia, Belgium, and France as quota success because they 
have been passing pro-woman reform bills and expanding their quotas within politics and in the 
private sector.  Though these indicators are very important indicators of quota success, this 
contradictory marker of leadership inequality is also telling.  While Belgium, Slovenia, and 
France certainly have more female party leadership than Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina, their 
party leadership is still male dominated.  This measurement—though not as severe as the South 
American countries—displays gender inequality that has probably also affected quota success in 
these countries. 
 Measurements of real political power are key to understanding quota success or failure, 
and more broadly, our understanding of effective representation in its entirety.  As this paper will 
conclude, a female seat in the legislature, or even a high female critical mass in the legislature, is 
not an indicator of real female political power.  Measurements of real political power should 
explore the resources, legitimacy, and political capital allocated to politicians.  These indicators 
would vary across countries as political systems and customs differ.  Some other useful 
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indicators of real political power for future study, however, may include membership on 
powerful committees or caucuses, leadership within those committees or caucuses, inclusion in 
cabinet positions, court appointments, party campaign funds allotted to candidates, ad space and 
television or radio airtime devoted to candidates, and the passage rates of bills authored by 
certain candidates.137 
 
Other Considerations 
 
 Other gender inequality indices have been critiqued because they were skewed in the 
favor of wealthy countries.  My index, like most others, takes reproductive health factors into 
account.  Wealthier countries with more advanced health systems will generally have the 
resources to promote better reproductive healthcare, reducing maternal mortality and adolescent 
birth rates.   
As we can see in Figure 4, this is a valid consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Recently, political scientists have started examining this bill passage data as they have realized that quota driven 
critical mass increases are not necessarily indicative of quota success.  My early research plan intended to examine 
bill topics, female bill passage rates, and bill sponsorship.  I quickly realized that this route would require a several 
more months of information gathering and sorting aided by research assistants who fluently spoke Portuguese, 
French, Dutch, German, and Slovenian.  Though I later settled on party leadership as a point of analysis for real 
female political power, I was able to find some brief bill passage analyses in my preliminary research.  These 
findings are included in Appendix 2.   
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Figure 4 
Relationship between Enright Index Scores and 2014 GDP Per Capita138 
 
 There is a very wide range of Enright Index scores for countries with a 2014 GDP per 
capita of less than $10,000, indicating that it is certainly possible for poor countries to have high 
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measures of gender equality.139  All countries with 2014 GDPs per capita greater than $20,000, 
however, had below average gender inequality.  This relationship tells us that the critique of 
GDP’s influence on gender inequality measurements has merit.   We must keep this relationship 
in mind while evaluating gender equality from a qualitative lens.  In spite of the tendency for 
wealthy countries to have below average gender inequality, poorer countries can, and have, 
demonstrated strong gender equality. 
 I also generated scatter plots comparing 2014 GDP per capita with all four components of 
the Enright Index: maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, difference in education between 
men and women, and difference in labor force participation between men and women.  I was 
curious if GDP per capita influenced any of these factors more strongly than others.  Figure 5 
displays that relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Perhaps most interesting is Myanmar.  Myanmar had a 2014 GDP per capita of $1,244 but has very low gender 
inequality on the Enright index.  Myanmar scored slightly worse than average in maternal mortality rates, but was 
far better than the average global adolescent birth rates, male and female education differences, and labor force 
participation rate differences.  Myanmar does not have a gender quota and has 5% female representation in its 
legislative body. 
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        Figure 5 
Influence of GDP Per Capita on individual components of the Enright Index 
 
 Maternal Mortality Ratio                                    Adolescent Birth Rate 
 
Male and Female Educational Difference             Male and Female Labor Force Participation Differences 
 
 
These comparisons of 2014 GDP per capita with each Enright Index component echo the 
trends of the previous scatter plot comparing the 2014 GDP per capita with the aggregate Enright 
Index.  In general, countries with higher GDPs per capita also tend to have lower gender 
inequality, according to these Enright Index markers.  Like the scatter plot comparing the overall 
Enright Index with 2014 GDP per capita, however, there is a great deal of score variation among 
countries with very low GDP per capita.  This tells that, although wealthy countries tend to score 
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better in terms of equality, there are several poor countries that also display markers of strong 
gender inequality.   
The Maternal Mortality Ratio plot contains a large cluster of countries in the lower left 
corner, indicating several countries with a low maternal mortality ratio and a low 2014 GDP per 
capita.  This cluster is not as prominent in the Adolescent Birth Rate plot.  Though there are poor 
countries with low adolescent birth rates, wealthy countries generally perform better in this 
measurement. The remaining two components, which examine education and labor force 
participation are calculated by subtracting female values from male values.  In almost all cases, 
these outputs were positive, indicating that men had higher education and labor force 
participation rates than women.  In a select few cases, however, the outputs were negative, 
indicating that women attended secondary school at higher rates than men and that more women 
participated in the labor force than men.  Most of these female dominated educational attainment 
differences were minor (very close to zero difference), but in the cases of the United Arab 
Emirates, Libya, Gabon, and Micronesia the difference actually exceeded ten percent.  In the 
educational difference measurement, wealthy countries tend to have educational difference 
scores closer to zero, though several poor countries have scores near or even below zero.  
Interestingly, it is the poor countries that have the most points near zero in the labor force 
participation measurement (indicating roughly equal rates of male and female labor force 
participation).  This might be attributed to the increased necessity for a two family income in 
poor countries.  The four countries with higher female than male labor force participation rates 
were Malawi, Mozambique, Burundi, and Rwanda, and their differences between male and 
female participation were all below 3.2% 
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 Taken together, the overall Enright Index and the individual Enright Index components 
validate some scholarly suspicion of a bias towards wealthy countries in gender inequality 
indices.  In my opinion, however, the truly interesting result of these comparisons is that there is 
a surprisingly large number of poor countries that, despite minimal resources and other 
disadvantages, have managed to rival rich countries in one or more gender equality 
measurement.  This peculiarity would prompt interesting analysis in future research. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Quota success is contingent upon a high level of gender equality.  Gender equality is not 
necessarily dependent on the number of women in elected office.  As Figures 2 and 3 showed, 
there are several countries that have demonstrated success in measurements of gender equality 
with relatively few women in legislative office.  Simply putting a woman in parliament is not 
enough to enhance gender equality, and we know that while critical mass may be higher in 
several quota countries, this will not necessarily translate into pro-woman reform.  Measuring the 
real political power that female politicians wield is far more telling of the status of women than 
the critical mass of female politicians.  Examining the number of women who have become 
leaders of prominent political parties revealed that very few women in Bolivia, Argentina, and 
Brazil had amassed that level of power.  I conclude that this lack of substantive power has been a 
key barrier to quota success.  The data also shed light on quota success countries, however, and 
though these countries demonstrated more female political power than the South American 
countries, they still indicated a highly disproportionate leadership system.  Though the quota 
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laws in Belgium, France, and Slovenia have been deemed successful, perhaps a more equitable 
leadership climate would have fostered even more success. 
 The data gathered in this quantitative section create a framework for understanding the 
upcoming qualitative analysis.  These numerical analyses indicate some broad trends in gender 
inequality and their relationship with quota success, but the next session will further explain the 
cultural factors that impact each country’s quota system. 	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CHAPTER FIVE 	  
Qualitative Analysis: “The Production of a Female Authority” 
 
Introduction 
 
 This section aims to provide further insight into the relationship between gender 
inequality and quota failure through a qualitative lens.  I searched for news articles about the 
highest-ranking female politician in all six of my case study countries.  I predicted that the 
countries with high gender inequality, as established using the Enright Index in the previous 
chapter, would also feature obvious indicators of gender inequality in the news media regarding 
those high ranking female politicians.  Though the numerical indicators gathered in the Enright 
Index in the last section can tell us some basic information about gender inequality in each of 
those six countries, this qualitative section provides more insight into how that gender inequality 
manifests itself in the political realm of each country in question. In particular, I was interested in 
the way the expectation of aesthetic femininity affects female politicians’ legitimacy.  My 
findings suggest that the rigid expectations of feminine beauty placed on some female politicians 
indicate high gender inequality and can undermine female leaders’ legitimacy.140   
 Other scholars have also explored the relationship between sexist cultural markers and 
barriers to female representation.  As Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris explain in their book, 
Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World, sexist attitudes “have a 
powerful impact on political reality, since egalitarian values are significantly associated with 
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  Each article is cited once in a footnote at the beginning of the section.  All of the Portuguese and English 
translations are included in footnotes as well.	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women being successfully elected to office.  Culture matters.”141  Inglehart and Norris further 
explain that hostile attitudes toward women, as evidenced by cultural markers, are one of the 
most important barriers to women running for parliament.142  The rest of this section will explain 
how hostile attitudes toward women, as evidenced in various news sources, undermine female 
politicians’ legitimacy and ultimately impede quota success. 
 My qualitative study is primarily focused on findings from Argentina and Brazil.  
Searches for the two highest female politicians in those countries, former President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner and President Dilma Rousseff, respectively, yielded countless articles 
discussing both women’s physical appearance in relation to a feminine ideal.  The sections below 
present a selected sample of those search results143.  Close analysis of these news articles reveals 
intense and ubiquitous scrutiny placed on female politicians’ femininity at a level unparalleled 
by their male counterparts.  There are certainly some examples of male politicians in Argentina 
or Brazil who have been physically critiqued by the media, or who have opted for some aesthetic 
enhancements, but the volume of media attention devoted to these instances is exorbitantly 
surpassed by the number of articles critiquing female politicians’ physique in an objectifying 
manner.  My analysis in this section will help us understand how gender inequality in Argentina 
and Brazil limits female politicians’ power. 
 As discussed earlier in my methodology section, a thorough search for articles about 
Bolivia’s two highest-ranking female politicians yielded very few results.  While there were not 
any articles critiquing either woman’s physical appearance, there was also a noticeable scarcity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World. pp. 
144. 
142 Ibid. pp. 134. 
143 It should be noted that the majority of news articles about President Rousseff and President Fernández de 
Kirchner did focus solely on their policy and did not attempt to critique either woman’s physical appearance or 
femininity.  There were, however, a seemingly endless supply of articles that did criticize each woman’s physical 
appearance and femininity.  Even though these themes were not in the majority of articles published, they were an 
impressively prominent minority that indicates pervasive cultural themes.	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in any media attention for either woman.  There was, however, substantial media discussion of 
lower ranking male politicians in Bolivia.  Though we cannot unpack the role of femininity in 
Bolivian politics using a news media search, this absence is still indicative of a high level of 
gender inequality.  The lack of media attention for Gabriela Montaña Viaña and Betty Asunta 
Tejada Soruco in Bolivia suggests fewer resources, lower priority, and less public interest for 
female politicians in Bolivia. 
 A search for the highest-ranking female politicians in France, Belgium, and Slovenia did 
yield numerous results.  Christine Defraigne of Belgium, Édith Cresson of France, and Alenka 
Bratušek of Slovenia are all heavily represented in their respective countries’ news outlets.  The 
articles that appear about those women, however, almost exclusively discuss their political 
agendas.  A thorough search for these politicians with terms like “plastic surgery,” “fashion,” 
“makeup” and “weight” that yielded countless discussions about Presidents Rousseff and 
Fernández de Kirchner did not provide any results in French, Belgian, or Slovenian news outlets.  
This absence indicates to us that media objectification and intense physical scrutiny of female 
politicians in France, Belgium, and Slovenia is far less pervasive than it is in Brazil and 
Argentina.   
 
Argentina 
 
 This section offers a sample of four articles discussing President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner.  It includes on article from Perfil, one article from La Nación, and two articles from 
Clarín.  All of these sources are major news publications in Argentina.   
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Perfil:144 
A 2013 article from the Argentine newspaper, Perfil, entitled “Cristina Kirchner appeared 
with a renewed and stylized figure,”145 features an in depth analysis of then-President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner’s decision to wear leggings at the opening of a large industrial center in 
Ezeiza, Argentina.  Perfil is a large Argentine publication featuring news on politics, economics, 
and culture.  The article begins with an image gallery analyzing the President’s figure, displayed 
by the leggings.  The gallery then provides further commentary on some of President Fernández 
de Kirchner’s previous fashion choices.  While this article offers a detailed fashion analysis that 
would be rare for a male politician, the meticulous examination of President Fernández de 
Kirchner’s figure throughout the article further exemplifies the sexism that has accompanied her 
political career. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Gallardo, Augustín. "Cristina Kirchner Apareció Con Una Renovada Y Estilizada Figura."Perfil.com, September 
22, 2013. 
145 Cristina Kirchner apareció con una renovada y estilizada figura.	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Selected images from the photo gallery 
 
Translation: Evolution.  The President’s changing wardrobe.  Wide legged pants were always a 
present item [in her wardrobe].  On Friday, she wore leggings.  According to experts, Cristina 
could have undergone noninvasive aesthetic treatments. 
 
 
Translation: The President shows off her new figure in Ezeiza. 
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Translation: All eyes on the President’s new figure. 
 
Translation: Earlier, the President wore looser pants. 
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Translation: When not wearing pants, miniskirts are her favorite. 
 
 
Translation: For a ball pit, there is no better choice than pants. 
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 The article then goes on to describe the President’s alleged weight loss goals, saying, 
“Eliminate that small fat roll that’s always bothering you. (…) Undoubtedly, this is the dream of 
all women who wish to look good.  Cristina Kirchner is no exception.”146  The article finally 
describes her fitness regime, noting that she walks an hour every day.  It later reports that experts 
consulted by Perfil suggested that the President may have eliminated some of her fat using a 
technique called Cool Sculpting.  The article speculates that this fat reducing treatment may have 
been the reason that President Fernández de Kirchner began wearing leggings. 
It is important to note that this article did not contain a single explanation of the 
President’s business at the industrial complex opening in Ezeiza, nor did it mention of any of her 
policies, opinions, or experience as a politician.  Instead, it focused exclusively on critiquing 
President Fernández de Kirchner’s physical appearance within the constraints of a feminine 
ideal.  Her thin figure is of the utmost importance in this article.  The leggings accentuate her 
feminine figure and provide the opportunity to discuss her fitness regime and weight loss.  The 
article also sexualizes the President, noting that she favors miniskirts and that her leggings 
“revealed a well-sculpted figure.”147   
Taken together, these aspects can undermine President Fernández de Kirchner’s 
legitimacy.  The final photo, analyzing her ball pit fashion choice, is unpresidential.  The trivial 
discussion of her fashion, weight loss, and sexualization distracts from the image of a leader that 
most male politicians enjoy.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 “Eliminar ese rollito que tanto molesta. (…)  Sin duda, éste es el sueño de cualquier mujer que desea verse bien.  
Cristina Kirchner no es la excepción, 
147 que dejó ver una inédita y moldeada figura. 
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La Nación:148 
 A 2007 article in the Politics section of La Nación, one of Argentina’s leading 
newspapers, provides an in depth evaluation of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s feminine style.  
The article, titled “Secrets and mysteries of Cristina Kirchner’s glamorous look” features 
interviews with insiders who report on the President’s fashion and beauty tendencies.   
 The article opens by describing an encounter between President Fernández de Kirchner 
and Ecuadorian President, Rafael Correa.  It reads, “Cristina Kirchner looked at the audience and 
played with a white fan.  She moved her hands carefully.  Clumsiness could ruin her delicate hair 
in front of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa.”149 
It later describes her physical appearance, noting that her eyelashes are loaded with 
mascara, and she wears diamonds and a designer suit.  The author notes that the President is 
known for her expensive taste in designer fashion, and that the President seeks to achieve a 
“young and modern”150 style.  A picture included in the article claims that President Fernández 
de Kirchner frequently chooses silk and chiffon materials in her clothing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Fernández, Flavia. "Los Secretos Y Las Incógnitas Del Glamoroso Look Cristina Kirchner." La Nación, 
September 24, 2007. 
149 Cristina Kirchner miraba al public con un abanico blanco.  Movía las manos con cuidado.  Una torpeza podia 
arruinarle el delicado peinado frente al presidente ecuatoriano, Rafael Correa. 
150 joven y moderna.	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The author then speculates on the aging president’s plastic surgery rumors.  The article 
says, “it is evident that the fight against aging influences Cristina.”151  The author mentions that 
President Fernández de Kirchner may have undergone a facelift, used lip fillers, or used a 
botulinum toxin to treat dark under eye circles.   
The article closes by quoting Argentina fashion designer Benito Fernandez’s assessment 
of the President’s typical look, which he describes as “cute, sexy, (…) and modern.”152  The 
author concludes that, “‘the Mrs.’ does not seem to be planning to change her sexy look, but 
rather, to grow it into her own personal brand.”153  “The Mrs.” refers to the fact that President 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is the wife of the late President Nestór Kirchner, who was 
President of Argentina from 2003 to 2007 and passed away in 2010.  Both presidents were 
members of the left wing Justialista Party.  Cristina Fernández de Kirchner served in the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies and Senate before winning the 2007 presidential election.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 es evidente que la lucha contra el tiempo ocupa a Cristina. 
152 mona, sexy (…) y moderna. 
153 ’la señora’ parece que no piensa cambiar su look sexy, sino cultivarlo como marca propia.	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Despite President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s political background and qualifications, she 
is often remembered as President Nestór Kirchner’s wife. This article in La Nación offers several 
examples of sexist imagery, most notably, the discussion of a female President’s personal brand 
as, “cute” and “sexy.”  Needless to say, these are not the descriptors that accompany male 
politicians in Argentina.   
As discussed earlier, after the introduction of the quota law, female politicians in 
Argentina have often encountered challenges to their political authority due to association with 
male politicians.  This mujeres de stereotype casts women as the puppets of more powerful male 
politicians.  This perception has some basis in fact, of course, as some inexperienced and 
uneducated women are placed on Argentine ballots to fulfill quotas specifically because they will 
be easily manipulated by party leadership or another male politician if elected.   Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, however, has a law degree from the National University of La Plata, was 
active within the Peronist Youth as a young woman, and began her career in elected office 
eighteen years before assuming the presidency.  Referring to her as “Mrs.” in this article 
mischaracterizes her qualifications and authority as a leader.  It implies that she is not a 
legitimate head of state--merely someone’s wife. 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is a highly controversial figure, with a presidency marked 
by allegations of corruption, a stalling economy, and a 2015 approval rating at 29.8%154.  There 
was ample material for political critique and discussion of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s 
policies.  Instead, much of her media attention could be characterized by objectifying analyses of 
her physical appearance or references to her husband 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Bronetein, Hugh. "Argentina's Fernandez Approval Rating Driven down by Nisman - Poll." Reuters UK, 
February 23, 2015. 
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Clarín:155 
 Two other articles in the major Argentine newspaper, Clarín, echo these themes.  The 
first article is titled, “The style of president Cristina: more sober and discreet dress and 
makeup.”156  It describes the anticipation for the reveal of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s 
inauguration outfit, referring to her fashion choice as “almost a state secret.”  The author then 
describes at length nearly every aspect of the new President’s inauguration look, including a 
“white straight sleeveless dress with a hemline below the knee, with a jacket a few centimeters 
shorter than the dress, (…) sexy and very feminine high heels,  (…) loose hair with some waves, 
(…) and discreet makeup for an occasion that, as a woman after all, might prompt a few 
tears.”157  My search for fashion commentary on current Argentina President Mauricio Macri’s 
inauguration look did not yield any results, nor was there speculation that the new president 
would tear up during the ceremony.  This mention of the possibility that President Fernández de 
Kirchner may cry during her inauguration casts her as weak and fragile.  
 The article then explains that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s look has evolved, just like 
her politics.158  While the article does not provide any commentary on the President’s political 
evolution, it does deliver a comprehensive breakdown of her fashion journey from the 1970s to 
2007.   The author describes President Fernández de Kirchner’s use of woven shirts, wide belts, 
floral prints, and colorful suits.  The article then compares President Fernández de Kirchner’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Rodríguez, Carla. "El Estilo Cristina Presidenta: Vestido Ms Sobrio Y Maquillaje Ms Discreto." 
El Estilo Cristina Presidenta: Vestido Más Sobrio Y Maquillaje Más Discreto.  "Cristina Kirchner, En Un Ranking 
De Mujeres "mal Vestidas"" Clarín. 
156 El estilo Cristina presidenta: vestido más sobrio y maquillaje más discreto	  
157 There is no evidence that President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner cried publicly during the 2007 inauguration, 
nor is she known as a person who commonly cries. 
Estaba de blanco, con un vestido sin mangas recto hasta debajo de la rodilla y un tapado de guipure unos 
centímetros más corto. (…)zapatos altos al tono, sexies y muy femeninos 
 (…) el pelo suelto, con algunas ondas (…)y un maquillaje discreto para una ocasión que, mujer al fin, le iba a 
permitir seguir estando prolija aunque hubiera algunas lágrimas. 
158 “Como en la política, también en la moda Cristina Fernández de Kirchner ha recorrido un largo camino.” 	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fashion to that of Michelle Bachelet, Hillary Clinton, and Ségolène Royal and concludes that 
President Fernández de Kirchner’s look “prevails” over theirs. 
 A later Clarín article published in 2009 also compares President Fernández de Kirchner’s 
fashion with other female world leaders.  This article, called, “Cristina Kirchner, en un ranking 
de mujeres “mal vestidas,” meaning, “Cristina Kirchner in a ranking of ‘worst dressed’ women,” 
actually concludes that President Fernández de Kirchner is more poorly dressed than other 
female world leaders.   
 
Translation: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en el Palacio Real de Madrid. 
 The article criticizes the President’s outfit choice during a visit to the Royal Palace of 
Madrid.  It calls President Fernández de Kirchner’s outfit, consisting of a “burgundy colored 
skirt with a white flower pattern and a champagne-colored shirt,”159 “disheveled.”160  It also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  una pollera en color borravino con un estampado de flores blancas y una camisa en color champagne. 160	  despeinada. 	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claims that the fabrics she chose clashed with each other.  The article later notes that Queen Sofia 
and Princess Letizia of Spain are also poorly dressed female leaders. 
 Both of these articles demonstrate the powerful physical scrutiny that female politicians 
experience in Argentina.  When appearing publicly, a female politician can expect to have her 
weight, clothing, accessories, makeup, and hair closely critiqued by the media.  This expectation 
of near constant feminine perfection is indicative of a wide disparity in gender equality for a 
number of reasons.  First, this attention can detract from a female politician’s political 
legitimacy.  As we saw in these articles, it is common for a critique of a female politician’s 
aesthetic beauty to contain little to no mention of her politics.  This can distract the public from 
their political agenda and cast a female politician as unqualified or ineffective.  Second, these 
frequent physical critiques of female politicians are objectifying.  They place high value on a 
woman’s feminine figure, weight, hairstyle, and outfit.  This objectification reduces powerful 
female politicians’ value down to the style of her jacket or the prominence of her cheekbones.  
Finally, this standard is almost exclusively applied to women.  Male politicians in Argentina are 
not subject to this level of physical scrutiny or objectification.  This disparity indicates 
significant gender inequality, and it tells us that this gender inequality has a profound effect on 
society’s perception and value of female leaders. 
 
Brazil 
 
 This section examines articles from four major Brazilian media publications, Istoé 
Independente, Mulher, R7, and Agora.   These articles offer a sample of the seemingly countless 
public analyses of President Dilma Rousseff’s physical appearance and evolving femininity. 
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Istoe Independente:161 
Istoé Independente, a Brazilian magazine published weekly, released an article entitled, 
“How to Build a Candidate.”162 The article details the great lengths to which Brazilian president, 
Dilma Rousseff, went to in order to enhance her feminine appearance and win the 2010 election.  
The article explains that President Rousseff’s “more serene face, more open eyes and well 
designed mouth”163 were the result of plastic surgery.  As the article shows, President Rousseff’s 
extensive make over was part of a “well planned strategy with a single purpose: to give Rousseff 
a less stern and more sympathetic profile as part of the package that was needed to transform her 
(…) into a candidate.”164   
In 2007, when then-President Lula began suggesting that Dilma Rousseff should be his 
successor, a team was gathered to organize her transformation.  This group consisted of John 
Santana, a political marketing expert; Laurez Cerqueira, a journalist; Tian, a prominent 
hairdresser; Franklin Martins, the Minister of Social Communication; Sergio Panizzon, a 
surgeon; and President Lula as an informal advisor.  The team decided that Rousseff’s physical 
image would need to become more soft and feminine in order for her to gain mass public 
support.  According to Istoé Independente, she began to diet and take Pilates in 2008 and lost 
twelve kilograms.  Santana then transitioned her out of her wardrobe, known for dark suits, to 
lighter suits with flower accents.  Rousseff also stopped wearing glasses in favor of contact 
lenses.  Panizzon’s team later performed plastic surgery on Rousseff, which included lifting her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Lago, Rudolfo, and Sérgio Pardellas. "Como Construir Uma Candidata." ISTO Independente, January 21, 2009. 
162 The Portugues word for candidate is um candidato, which is masculine.  The title of this article changes the 
spelling of candidate to be feminine (uma candidata), which is spelling change indicating that the particular 
candidate being discussed in the article is a woman. 
como construir uma candidate. 
163 O rosto mais sereno, de olhos mais abertos e boca bem desenhada. 
164 uma estratégia bem planejada com um único propósito: o de conferir a Dilma um perfil menos sisudo e mais 
simpático e ser a embalagem que faltava para transformar a (…)candidata do governo. 
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eyelids, thinning her nose, and reducing wrinkle lines between her nose and lips.  Finally, her 
hairdresser, Tian, lightened her hair color and decided on a new haircut that would reduce the 
apparent size of Rousseff’s forehead.  The Istoé Independente article shows a photo timeline of 
Rousseff’s evolving look. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  
99 
 
 
Translation: METAMORPHASIS the various faces of Dilma Rousseff, from the guerilla era, 
through the South Rio Grande government, to the Federal Ministry. 
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 As the article explains, the Presidential Palace then commissioned a focus group in an 
attempt to assess the potential effects that Rousseff’s make over would have on the upcoming 
election.  A heterogeneous group was gathered, including members of various social classes, to 
discuss the candidate’s transformation.  The members of the focus group described Rousseff’s 
new look as “smooth.”165 
Istoé Independente’s report reflects the very strict standards of femininity to which 
female politicians are held in Brazil.  Rousseff was perceived to be to aesthetically “hard,” and in 
order to appeal to the public in a way that would allow her to win an election, a team of experts 
including a sitting president determined that she would require a complete physical 
transformation to feminize her look.   
Some male politicians in Brazil have also received coaching on their physical 
appearances, including wardrobe updates or minor aesthetic upgrades like teeth whitening or hair 
plugs.166   Brazil is the world’s second largest167 provider of plastic surgery, with 2,058,505 
plastic surgeries performed in 2014.168  There are a few reports of some male politicians also 
undergoing plastic surgery.  The level of physical scrutiny that Dilma Rousseff has encountered, 
however, is unparalleled among major Brazilian leaders.  There are countless articles examining 
her wardrobe, hair, and figure, as I will display later in this section. 
Drastically altering Dilma Rousseff’s appearance to fit within a more feminine standard 
was integral to her ability to win the 2010 election.  Dilma Rousseff is known for her toughness, 
including imprisonment and torture for opposing Brazil’s right wing dictatorship.  While for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 suavidade 
166 Lima, Luciana. "Para Fazer Bonito, Presidenciáveis Fazem De Implante Capilar a Cirurgia Plástica - 
Política." Último Segundo, December 8, 2014. 
167 The United States provides the most plastic surgeries annually compared to other nations.  In 2014, 4,064,571 
plastic surgeries were performed in the United States.   
168 Lewin, Michael L. "ISAPS International Survey on Aesthetic/Cosmetic Procedures Performed in 2014."  2014. 
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some male politicians, this toughness may have been an asset, Rousseff was coached to 
downplay this characteristic because she needed to come across as more soft and feminine.   
  
Mulher169 
 A 2011 article in the Brazilian publication, Mulher, analyzes Dilma Rousseff’s fashion.  
Mulher, is a large Brazilian women’s interest magazine that discusses issues such as health, 
career, and style.  The article, titled,  “Dilma Rousseff’s Style”170 discusses the president’s 
fashion.  The article begins opens with, “besides, of course, political issues, another theme 
promises to be important to the president: style.  Which clothes, makeup, and hair styles are 
preferred by Brazil’s highest authority?”171 
 The article later describes President Rousseff’s outfit for the inauguration ceremony, 
which is described as a “classic look”172 with white embroidery and pearls.  It is noted that her 
hair and makeup were discreet.   The author points out that President Rousseff has opted for a 
number of aesthetic changes since running for president.  The author speculates that President 
Rousseff’s decision to cut and color her hair was inspired by Venezuelan designer, Carolina 
Herrera.  She later explains that Rousseff’s image consultant, Alexandre Herchovitch, worked on 
her wardrobe during her campaign, and make-up artist/personal advisor, Rose Pearce, was 
responsible for styling Rousseff’s hair on a daily basis. 
 Articles describing Brazilian male politician’s inauguration outfits and campaign trail 
beauty regimens are virtually non-existent.  In contrast, there are several articles that provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Crespo, Camila. "Estilo Dilma Rousseff." Mulher. January 03, 2011. 
170 Estilo Dilma Rousseff. 
171 além, é claro, de assuntos politicos, outra temática promente ser recorrente ao se flar na presidenta: estilo.  Que 
roupas, maquiagem, e cabelos são os preferidos da autoridade maxima brasileira?” 
172 um look classic. 	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detailed analysis of President Rousseff’s physical appearance during her inauguration, like this 
one.  Though the author does briefly allude to the fact that President Rousseff does participate in 
politics by mentioning the phrase “political issues”173 and noting that she is “Brazil’s highest 
authority,”174 she does not go on to explain her political background or agenda at any length.  
This heavy emphasis on physical appearance without discussion of her political role is incredibly 
uncommon to find among articles concerning Brazilian male politicians. 
 Additionally, this article underscores the pressure that female politicians face to adhere to 
a feminine beauty expectation.  As a candidate, Rousseff used a team of consultants to style her.  
Though some male politicians also receive similar assistance, Rousseff relied on an image team 
to do her hair, make up, and strategically choose her wardrobe on a daily basis.  The expectation 
of beauty that President Rousseff faced was unparalleled by her male counterparts. 
 
R7175 
 A 2015 article published in R7, entitled, “President Dilma Rousseff’s diet becomes 
fashionable in Espanada,”176 discusses how other politicians in Brazil have adopted President 
Rousseff’s pre-inauguration weight loss program.  R7 is the online publication of Grupo Record, 
which is the third largest media company in Brazil.  This article was published under their news 
section. 
 The article explains that President Dilma Rousseff adopted a weight loss strategy 
designed by Argentine doctor, Maximo Ravenna, before her inauguration.  The diet eliminates 
refined carbohydrates and sugars.  According to the article, several other prominent Brazilian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 assuntos politicos. 
174 autoridade máxima brasileira. 
175 http://noticias.r7.com/brasil/dieta-da-presidente-dilma-rousseff-vira-moda-na-esplanada-24012015 
176 Dieta da presidente Dilma Rousseff vira moda na Esplanada.	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politicians adopted the Ravenna diet after President Rousseff’s inauguration.  R7 reports that the 
Minister of Policy Secretariat for Women, Eleonora Menicucci lost seventeen kilograms in six 
months, Congresswoman Erika Kokay lost twenty-four kilograms, and Chief Justice José 
Eduardo Cardozo lost seven point five kilograms.  The article features a before and after photo of 
Chief Justice José Eduardo Cardozo and a photo of all politicians mentioned in the article.  
 
The article concludes by noting that the popularity of the Ravenna diet has risen by 30% in 
Brasilia since the President’s weight loss.  
 This article is notable because it was one of very few Brazilian publications to mention a 
male politician’s weight loss strategies.  Like the female politicians mentioned in this article, the 
author did not include any description of Chief Justice José Eduardo Cardozo’s political 
background.  Despite the extreme rarity of this occurrence, the R7 article still does point to some 
inequality between male and female politicians.  Firstly, three female politicians’ weight loss is 
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discussed in this article compared to one man’s weight loss.  Secondly, the women mentioned in 
this article reportedly lost significantly more weight than Chief Justice José Eduardo Cardozo.  
Finally, the article mentions several times that President Dilma Rousseff inspired this diet among 
politicians and among citizens of Brasilia.  There are numerous Brazilian news sources177 that 
discuss the influence of President Rousseff’s diet, and though presidents tend to be very 
influential people, President Rousseff is the only Brazilian president to have gained this much 
attention and scrutiny over her figure. 
 
Agora178  
 In 2013, major news outlet, Agora, published an article called “Dilma’s hairstyle and 
makeup cost R$ 3,125.”179 The first lines of the article read, “vanity has its price.  And higher 
and higher, as shown by the costs to fix Dilma Rousseff’s hair and makeup for her appearances 
on national television.”180  The article references budget reports obtained using the Brazilian 
Access to Information Act.  In the early budgets, the president is allotted R$ 400181 for visual 
costs before national television appearances.  Later reports, however, showed that the president’s 
visual cost budget increased dramatically.  When questioned, President Rousseff’s staff released 
a letter explaining that the “production of a ‘female authority’ is different [from a male authority] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Carmo, Marcia. "‘Dilma é Linda’, Diz Argentino Criador De Dieta Da Presidente." BBC Brasil, September 10, 
2015. 
"Ravenna: Emagrecimento De Dilma Inspira as Pessoas." Brasil 247. May 17, 2015.  
Mendonça, Heloísa. "O Médico Argentino Que Colocou Dilma (e a Esplanada) De Dieta." EL PAÍS, January 19, 
2015.  
178 "Penteado E Maquiagem De Dilma Custam R$ 3.125." Agora. June 26, 2013. 
179 R$ 3.125 = $830 USD. 
Penteado e maquiagem de Dilma custam R$ 3.125. 
180 a vaidade tem seu preço.  E cada vez mais alto, como mostra a evolução dos gastos para arrumar o cabelo e 
maquiar a presidente Dilma Rousseff para suas aparições em rede nacional de TV. 
181 R$ 400 = $106 USD. 
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and they authorized the cost increase because a woman needs a specific [makeup] professional 
and not a standard makeup artist, as was the case of ex-President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.”182 
 The Rousseff administration, like many Brazilian political administrations, has been 
marked by corruption scandals.  We must recall this context while analyzing the Agora article, 
and understand that President Rousseff has faced public scrutiny for a number of government 
spending controversies, not just this relatively minor increase in visual cost spending.   
 Still, this article certainly underscores differences in the expectations of male and female 
politicians.  As President Rousseff’s staff explains, the production of a female authority is much 
different from the production of a male authority.  The production of a female authority requires 
a great deal of time and money invested into the creation of a thin, attractive, and well-groomed 
body.  To be a legitimate female authority, this feminine standard is expected at all times.  While 
there is leeway for a male politician’s aesthetic appearance in Brazil, for prominent female 
politicians, this feminine standard is paramount.  Like in Argentina, this difference is indicative 
of important disparities in gender equality in Brazil.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The detailed attention that female politicians receive concerning their aesthetic femininity 
can distract the public from their political legitimacy.  The expectation of femininity also limits 
the number of women who have the potential to become prominent leaders.  Those who do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182  a produção de "uma autoridade do sexo feminino" é diferente e autorizou o ajuste nos custos porque uma 
mulher precisa de um profissional específico e não um maquiador padrão, como era o caso do ex-presidente Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva. 	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naturally fit the feminine norm, or do not have the resources to surgically alter themselves to fit 
that norm, will have trouble being viewed as viable political candidates.   
Overall, the lofty expectations of feminine beauty indicate a political realm that is 
dominated by misogyny.  A culture where objectifying female world leaders with trivial and 
demeaning discussions of their sexiness, thinness, and softness in major news outlets is a culture 
that is not well equipped to promote female political empowerment.  This misogynistic political 
culture is also relevant to Bolivia, where high-ranking female leaders are not afforded hardly any 
media discussion—positive or negative. 
On the contrary the highest-ranking female politicians in France, Slovenia, and Belgium 
were not subject to the level of physical scrutiny of President Rousseff and President Fernández 
de Kirchner.  The articles about President of the Senate Defraigne, Prime Minister Cresson, and 
Prime Minister Bratušek—though certainly not always positive—were not ridden with 
objectifying analyses of each woman’s figure, nor the expectation that each woman should 
undergo plastic surgery in order to be viewed as a female authority.  In short, these female 
politicians were not subject to the same level of feminine critique as politicians in Argentina and 
Brazil.  In contrast to Bolivia, the high-ranking female politicians in France, Belgium, and 
Slovenia also had a vast record of media attention, indicating general public interest and respect 
for their political office. 
This difference provides important insight into our understanding of quota success.  I 
argue that quota success is contingent on a pre-existing high level of gender equality.  Quotas 
will not facilitate pro-woman political reform if female politicians are not regarded with the 
respect and authority afforded to their male counterparts.  With this relationship in mind, it is not 
surprising that media searches for high-ranking women in quota success countries did not yield a 
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large supply of objectifying articles like the searches for Argentina and Brazil did.  After 
learning that even the most powerful women in Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia face daily affronts 
to their political legitimacy due to misogynistic beauty standards or media bias, it makes sense 
that lower ranking female legislators in those countries would also encounter formidable barriers 
to enacting pro-woman reform in Congress. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Quotas as a Catalyst 
 
Review of the Study 
 
Quota success is contingent upon a high level of gender equality.   Though quotas can 
increase critical mass if well enforced, female politicians must be afforded the legitimacy 
necessary to have real political power.  This legitimacy is severely undermined in nations with 
high gender inequality, as is very apparent in the studies included in this paper.   
Media attention on the highest-ranking female leaders in Brazil and Argentina was rife 
with examples of misogyny and objectification.  Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma 
Rousseff are both highly educated and experienced leaders, yet much of the publicity devoted to 
them undercuts their legitimacy by objectifying them and harshly critiquing their femininity.  
From speculating about womanly tears during the inauguration, classifying a president’s personal 
brand as “cute and sexy,” and offering detailed critiques of each woman’s weight, these media 
portrayals indicate a gendered double standard.  Though there are hundreds of available articles 
about Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma Rousseff’s physical appearance, there are 
extremely few about male politicians in Argentina and Brazil.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
and perhaps even more telling, is the utter lack of media attention on leading female politicians 
in Bolivia. While their male counterparts and subordinates are featured in the press, Gabriela 
Montaña Viaña and Betty Asunta Tejada Soruco are rarely afforded any media attention.  In 
comparison, the highest-ranking female politicians in Slovenia, France, and Belgium are featured 
very frequently in the press, and they do not face anywhere near the level of objectification and 
physical media scrutiny as women in Argentina and Brazil. 
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This distinction matters.  It not only indicates a much higher level of gender inequality in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, it tells us how this gender inequality has affected female political 
power.  The highest-ranking female politicians in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil are either 
belittled or ignored in the media, which limits their authority and political capital.  Under this 
system, male politicians have an inherent advantage over female politicians.  With this 
relationship in mind, it makes sense that quota laws would flounder in countries with high gender 
inequality.  As we’ve seen in quota failure countries with high gender inequality, gender bill 
passage is minimal, puppet politicians are included in the place of qualified leaders, harassment 
and intimidation tactics dissuade some women from running for office, and loopholes are used to 
cripple advancements in critical mass.  Pro-woman reform is limited in countries where female 
politicians lack real political power.   
The difference between critical mass and real political power is crucial to our 
understanding of the relationship between gender inequality and quota success.  Increasing 
female critical mass through gender quotas does not necessarily lead to real political power, 
which I define as substantial and meaningful political influence measured by the resources, 
legitimacy, and political capital allocated to politicians.  This trend was somewhat evident in this 
study’s comparison of female party leadership.  The quota success case studies generally had 
higher rates of female party leadership than the quota failure case studies.  Still, one would 
expect quota countries that have been deemed successful by various scholars to have much 
higher female real political power than was evidenced by their female party leadership rates.  
Though still generally higher than this study’s quota failure female party leadership rates, the 
lower than expected female party leadership rates in Belgium, France, and Slovenia lead me to 
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question their female politicians’ real political power, and in turn, the degree of their quota 
success. 
 
Broader Discussion of Critical Mass 
 
Even beyond quota success, this study disaggregates the relationship between high 
female critical mass and gender inequality.  Quota laws, of course, are inextricably linked to the 
discussion critical mass because they were implemented for the purpose of augmenting female 
political representation.  High critical mass, however, is not necessarily an indicator of gender 
equality—in countries with and without gender quotas.  I think that we could actually remove the 
remove the variable of quota success or failure from this study, replace it with critical mass in 
general, and receive roughly the same results: an increase in critical mass will not catalyze pro-
woman reform in countries with high gender inequality.   
If increased critical mass does not necessarily stimulate pro-woman reform, what is the 
utility of a quota law?  Have quota mandates proved to be a fool’s errand?  Despite some of my 
reservations about quota efficacy, I conclude that quotas can equalize representation and drive 
pro-woman legislative reform in some cases.  With increased female critical mass, Slovenia, 
France, and Belgium have engaged in some gender mainstreaming initiatives and have passed 
several pro-woman bills.  Quotas acted as the catalyst that spurred that increase in critical mass 
and consequent gender mainstreaming. I’ve come to believe, however, that the right conditions 
must be in place for quotas to catalyze that feminist development. 
The first of these conditions is, of course, a high degree of gender equality.  Female 
politicians cannot truly be effective representatives if they are not afforded adequate respect and 
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legitimacy.  Without real female political power, a high proportion of female representation is 
virtually meaningless. 
In addition to gender inequality, I also hypothesize that a certain cultural acceptance of 
affirmative action programs must be present for a quota to be publicly accepted.  For example, I 
doubt that a gender quota would be successful in the United States.  Though the United States 
has a comparable level of gender equality to Slovenia, France, and Belgium, affirmative action 
policies are highly controversial among Americans, particularly the use of specific quotas within 
affirmative action decision-making.183 The Democratic Party actually did implement some 
quotas in 1972.  Their party quotas mandated that the makeup of each state’s Democratic 
delegation reflect “in reasonable relationship” the proportion of of that state’s women and 
minorities, but this rule was abandoned after the 1972 convention after the concept quickly lost 
popularity.184  I would assume that if the United States did implement a legislated quota law 
today, female politicians would lose a great deal of their legitimacy because Americans would 
resent such heavy handed government ballot regulation and doubt female politicians’ 
qualifications compared to their male counterparts.  
Finally, quotas must fit within a broader framework of gender mainstreaming in order to 
catalyze pro-woman reform.  When combined with a broad political and societal push toward 
gender equality, quota induced critical mass increases can augment real female political power.  
Some scholars have conceptualized Slovenia, Belgium, and France’s quota laws components of 
broader gender mainstreaming initiatives.  Perhaps as their gender mainstreaming movements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Bouie, Jamelle. "Where Do Americans Stand on Affirmative Action?" The American Prospect. June 13, 2013. 
Feldman, Stanley, and Leonie Huddy. "Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race‐Conscious Programs: 
Principles or Prejudice?" 
184 Broder, David S. "The Democrats' Dilemma." The Atlantic. March 1974. 	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gain strength we’ll see further growth in those countries’ real female political power, exemplified 
by much higher female party leadership and other indicators. 
Quotas, under the right conditions, are a catalyst for gender equality, not a quick fix.  
Quotas will fail when they are used as a vehicle to increase critical mass without seeking to 
fundamentally revolutionize the socio-political system that oppresses women.  When a quota is 
introduced in a country with high gender equality as part of a broad gender mainstreaming 
initiative, however, it can catalyze pro-woman reform and real political power.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
Enright Index Dataset 
 
 This appendix contains the complete dataset used in the creation of the Enright Index.  
The data is derived from the 2014 United Nations Human Development Report.185  Refer to 
pages 45-56 for a full explanation in the Enright Index calculation. 
Any blank cells or cells filled with ellipses represent gaps in the United Nations Human 
Development Report data.  The case study countries are all highlighted in yellow.  The first 
section of this dataset displays the raw data taken from the United Nations Human Development 
Report.  The second section of this dataset shows the z-scores taken calculated from the raw data, 
the final Enright Index score for each country, each country’s 2014 percentage of female 
legislative seats, and each country’s 2014 GDP per capita.  The Enright Index measures 
inequality, where a negative score indicates below average gender inequality while a positive 
score indicates above average gender inequality. 
Recall the following definitions:  
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR): the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in one 
year. 
Adolescent Birth Rate (ABR): the annual number of live births to adolescent women per 1,000 
adolescent women. 
Educational Difference (ED): the number of men who have attained some secondary school 
education minus the number of women who have attained some secondary school education. 
Labor Force Participation Difference (LFRD): the number of men in the labor force minus the 
number of women in the labor force. 
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Country MMR ABR 
Educated 
women 
Educated 
Men 
ED Female LFPR Male LFPR LDPRD 
Norway 4 7.8 97.4 96.7 -0.614 61.2 68.7 7.500 
Australia 6 12.1 94.3 94.6 0.344 58.8 71.8 13.000 
Switzerland 6 1.9 95.0 96.6 1.565 61.8 74.9 13.100 
Denmark 5 5.1 95.5 96.6 1.015 58.7 66.4 7.700 
Netherlands 6 6.2 87.7 90.5 2.784 58.5 70.6 12.100 
Germany 7 3.8 96.3 97.0 0.743 53.6 66.4 12.800 
Ireland 9 8.2 80.5 78.6 -1.958 53.1 68.1 15.000 
United States 28 31.0 95.1 94.8 -0.331 56.3 68.9 12.600 
Canada 11 14.5 100.0 100.0 0.000 61.6 71.0 9.400 
New Zealand 8 25.3 95.0 95.3 0.361 62.0 73.8 11.800 
Singapore 6 6.0 74.1 81.0 6.906 58.8 77.2 18.400 
Hong Kong .. 3.3 72.2 79.2 6.961 51.3 67.8 16.500 
Liechtenstein .. .. .. ..   .. ..   
Sweden 4 6.5 86.5 87.3 0.722 60.3 67.9 7.600 
UK 8 25.8 99.8 99.9 0.078 55.7 68.7 13.000 
Iceland 4 11.5 91.0 91.6 0.580 70.5 77.4 6.900 
Korea  27 2.2 77.0 89.1 12.064 50.1 72.1 22.000 
Israel 2 7.8 84.4 87.3 2.889 57.9 69.1 11.200 
Luxembourg 11 8.3 100.0 100.0 0.000 50.7 64.6 13.900 
Japan 6 5.4 87.0 85.8 -1.118 48.8 70.4 21.600 
Belgium 6 6.7 77.5 82.9 5.378 47.5 59.3 11.800 
France 12 5.7 78.0 83.2 5.195 50.7 61.6 10.900 
Austria 4 4.1 100.0 100.0 0.000 54.6 67.7 13.100 
Finland 4 9.2 100.0 100.0 0.000 55.7 64.0 8.300 
Slovenia 7 0.6 95.8 98.0 2.250 52.3 63.2 10.900 
Spain 4 10.6 66.8 73.1 6.361 52.5 65.8 13.300 
Italy 4 4.0 71.2 80.5 9.292 39.6 59.5 19.900 
Czech Republic 5 4.9 99.9 99.7 -0.127 51.1 68.3 17.200 
Greece 5 11.9 59.5 67.0 7.489 44.2 62.5 18.300 
Estonia 11 16.8 100.0 100.0 0.000 56.2 68.9 12.700 
Brunei Darussalam 27 23.0 63.9 67.8 3.910 52.6 75.3 22.700 
Cyprus 10 5.5 76.0 81.7 5.691 56.0 71.1 15.100 
Qatar 6 9.5 66.7 59.0 -7.634 50.8 95.5 44.700 
Andorra .. .. 49.5 49.3 -0.145 .. ..   
Slovakia 7 15.9 99.1 99.5 0.436 51.1 68.6 17.500 
Poland 3 12.2 79.4 85.5 6.097 48.9 64.9 16.000 
Lithuania 11 10.6 89.1 94.3 5.224 55.8 67.3 11.500 
Malta 9 18.2 68.6 78.2 9.660 37.9 66.3 28.400 
Saudi Arabia 16 10.2 60.5 70.3 9.816 20.2 78.3 58.100 
Argentina 69 54.4 56.3 57.6 1.280 47.5 75.0 27.500 
United Arab 
Emirates 8 27.6 73.1 61.2 -11.870 46.5 92.0 45.500 
Chile 22 55.3 73.3 76.4 3.097 49.2 74.8 25.600 
Portugal 8 12.6 47.7 48.2 0.520 54.9 66.2 11.300 
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Hungary 14 12.1 97.9 98.7 0.831 44.8 60.0 15.200 
Bahrain 22 13.8 56.7 51.4 -5.290 39.2 86.9 47.700 
Latvia 13 13.5 98.9 99.0 0.041 54.9 67.6 12.700 
Croatia 13 12.7 85.0 93.6 8.625 44.7 58.4 13.700 
Kuwait 14 14.5 55.6 56.3 0.644 43.6 83.1 39.500 
Montenegro 7 15.2 84.2 94.7 10.504 43.0 57.3 14.300 
Belarus 1 20.6 87.0 92.2 5.213 50.1 63.1 13.000 
Russian Federation 24 25.7 89.6 92.5 2.922 57.1 71.7 14.600 
Oman 11 10.6 47.2 57.1 9.944 29.0 82.6 53.600 
Romania 33 31.0 86.1 92.0 5.987 48.7 64.9 16.200 
Uruguay 14 58.3 54.4 50.3 -4.104 55.6 76.8 21.200 
Bahamas 37 28.5 91.2 87.6 -3.582 69.3 79.3 10.000 
Kazakhstan 26 29.9 95.3 98.8 3.500 67.7 77.9 10.200 
Barbados 52 48.4 89.5 87.7 -1.820 65.9 76.6 10.700 
Antigua and Barbuda .. 49.3 .. ..   .. ..   
Bulgaria 5 35.9 93.0 95.7 2.711 47.9 59.0 11.100 
Palau .. .. .. ..   .. ..   
Panama 85 78.5 54.0 49.9 -4.136 49.0 81.8 32.800 
Malaysia 29 5.7 65.1 71.3 6.211 44.4 75.5 31.100 
Mauritius 73 30.9 49.4 58.0 8.609 43.6 74.2 30.600 
Seychelles .. 56.3 66.9 66.6 -0.308 .. ..   
Trinidad and Tobago 84 34.8 59.7 60.9 1.160 53.0 75.5 22.500 
Serbia 16 16.9 58.4 73.6 15.136 44.5 60.9 16.400 
Cuba 80 43.1 74.3 78.8 4.460 43.4 70.0 26.600 
Lebanon 16 12.0 53.0 55.4 2.364 23.3 70.9 47.600 
Costa Rica 38 60.8 50.7 50.5 -0.278 46.6 79.0 32.400 
Iran  23 31.6 62.2 67.6 5.454 16.6 73.6 57.000 
Venezuela 110 83.2 56.6 50.8 -5.710 51.1 79.2 28.100 
Turkey 20 30.9 39.0 60.0 21.030 29.4 70.8 41.400 
Sri Lanka 29 16.9 72.7 76.4 3.650 35.1 76.3 41.200 
Mexico 49 63.4 55.7 60.6 4.986 45.1 79.9 34.800 
Brazil 69 70.8 54.6 52.4 -2.216 59.4 80.8 21.400 
Georgia 41 46.8 89.7 92.7 3.002 56.5 75.1 18.600 
Saint Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. ..   .. ..   
Azerbaijan 26 40.0 93.7 97.4 3.675 62.9 69.6 6.700 
Grenada 23 35.4 .. ..   .. ..   
Jordan 50 26.5 69.5 78.5 9.018 15.6 66.6 51.000 
Macedonia 7 18.3 40.2 55.6 15.441 43.1 67.5 24.400 
Ukraine 23 25.7 91.7 95.9 4.170 53.2 66.9 13.700 
Algeria 89 10.0 26.7 31.0 4.360 15.2 72.2 57.000 
Peru 89 50.7 56.3 66.1 9.775 68.2 84.4 16.200 
Albania 21 15.3 81.8 87.9 6.088 44.9 65.5 20.600 
Armenia 29 27.1 94.0 95.0 0.970 54.2 72.6 18.400 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 8 15.1 44.9 69.8 24.912 34.1 57.3 23.200 
Ecuador 87 77.0 40.1 39.4 -0.731 54.7 82.7 28.000 
Saint Lucia 34 56.3 .. ..   62.7 76.2 13.500 
China 32 8.6 58.7 71.9 13.209 63.9 78.3 14.400 
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Fiji 59 42.8 64.2 64.5 0.290 37.5 72.0 34.500 
Mongolia 68 18.7 85.3 84.1 -1.192 56.6 69.3 12.700 
Thailand 26 41.0 35.7 40.8 5.109 64.3 80.7 16.400 
Dominica .. .. 29.7 23.2 -6.506 .. ..   
Libya 15 2.5 55.5 41.9 -13.590 30.0 76.4 46.400 
Tunisia 46 4.6 32.8 46.1 13.280 25.1 70.9 45.800 
Colombia 83 68.5 56.9 55.6 -1.305 55.8 79.7 23.900 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 45 54.5 .. ..   55.7 78.0 22.300 
Jamaica 80 70.1 74.0 70.2 -3.750 56.1 70.9 14.800 
Tonga 120 18.1 87.5 88.3 0.767 53.5 74.6 21.100 
Belize 45 71.4 76.4 75.8 -0.619 49.2 82.3 33.100 
Dominican Republic 100 99.6 55.6 53.1 -2.468 51.3 78.6 27.300 
Suriname 130 35.2 44.6 47.1 2.526 40.5 68.8 28.300 
Maldives 31 4.2 27.3 32.7 5.310 56.2 77.5 21.300 
Samoa 58 28.3 64.3 60.0 -4.356 23.5 58.4 34.900 
Botswana 170 44.2 73.6 77.9 4.230 71.9 81.6 9.700 
Moldova  21 29.3 93.6 96.6 2.980 37.6 44.2 6.600 
Egypt 45 43.0 43.9 60.6 16.750 23.7 74.8 51.100 
Turkmenistan 61 18.0 .. ..   46.9 76.9 30.000 
Gabon 240 
103.
0 53.9 36.1 -17.770 56.2 65.4 9.200 
Indonesia 190 48.3 39.9 49.2 9.355 51.4 84.2 32.800 
Paraguay 110 67.0 36.8 43.0 6.150 55.7 84.8 29.100 
Palestine, State of .. 45.8 53.9 59.4 5.463 15.4 66.4 51.000 
Uzbekistan 36 38.8 .. ..   48.1 75.6 27.500 
Philippines 120 46.8 65.9 63.7 -2.190 51.1 79.7 28.600 
El Salvador 69 76.0 36.8 43.6 6.754 47.8 79.0 31.200 
South Africa 140 50.9 72.7 75.9 3.200 44.5 60.5 16.000 
Viet Nam 49 29.0 59.4 71.2 11.779 73.0 82.2 9.200 
Bolivia 200 71.9 47.6 59.1 11.502 64.2 80.9 16.700 
Kyrgyzstan 75 29.3 94.5 96.8 2.327 56.0 79.5 23.500 
Iraq 67 68.7 27.8 50.2 22.470 14.9 69.8 54.900 
Cabo Verde 53 70.6 .. ..   51.5 83.7 32.200 
Micronesia  96 18.6 .. ..   .. ..   
Guyana 250 88.5 60.3 47.8 -12.530 42.6 80.5 37.900 
Nicaragua 100 
100.
8 39.4 38.3 -1.140 47.4 80.3 32.900 
Morocco 120 35.8 20.7 30.2 9.540 26.5 75.8 49.300 
Namibia 130 54.9 33.3 34.4 1.170 54.7 63.7 9.000 
Guatemala 140 97.2 21.9 23.2 1.320 49.3 88.2 38.900 
Tajikistan 44 42.8 95.1 91.2 -3.850 58.9 77.1 18.200 
India 190 32.8 27.0 56.6 29.580 27.0 79.9 52.900 
Honduras 120 84.0 28.0 25.8 -2.121 42.8 82.9 40.100 
Bhutan 120 40.9 34.0 34.5 0.551 66.7 77.2 10.500 
Timor-Leste 270 52.2 .. ..   24.6 50.8 26.200 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 49 41.6 29.5 40.5 10.980 13.5 72.7 59.200 
Vanuatu 86 44.8 .. ..   61.5 80.0 18.500 
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Congo 410 
126.
7 39.7 47.0 7.270 68.5 73.0 4.500 
Kiribati 130 16.6 .. ..   .. ..   
Equatorial Guinea 290 
112.
6 .. ..   80.7 92.2 11.500 
Zambia 280 
125.
4 25.8 44.0 18.140 73.1 85.6 12.500 
Ghana 380 58.4 45.2 64.7 19.464 67.3 71.4 4.100 
Laos .. 65.0 22.9 37.0 14.140 76.3 79.1 2.800 
Bangladesh 170 80.6 34.1 41.3 7.250 57.4 84.1 26.700 
Cambodia 170 44.3 9.9 22.9 13.080 78.8 86.5 7.700 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 210 65.1 .. ..   45.3 77.8 32.500 
Kenya 400 93.6 25.3 31.4 6.098 62.2 72.4 10.200 
Nepal 190 73.7 17.7 38.2 20.540 79.9 87.1 7.200 
Pakistan 170 27.3 19.3 46.1 26.783 24.6 82.9 58.300 
Myanmar 200 12.1 22.9 15.3 -7.670 75.2 82.3 7.100 
Angola 460 
170.
2 .. ..   63.3 76.9 13.600 
Swaziland 310 72.0 21.9 26.0 4.140 43.9 71.6 27.700 
Tanzania  410 
122.
7 5.6 9.5 3.940 88.1 90.2 2.100 
Nigeria 560 
119.
6 .. ..   48.2 63.7 15.500 
Cameroon 590 
115.
8 21.3 34.9 13.510 63.8 76.8 13.000 
Madagascar 440 
122.
8 .. ..   86.6 90.5 3.900 
Zimbabwe 470 60.3 48.7 62.0 13.300 83.2 89.7 6.500 
Mauritania 320 73.3 8.3 20.9 12.610 28.7 79.1 50.400 
Solomon Islands 130 64.9 .. ..   53.4 79.0 25.600 
Papua New Guinea 220 62.1 7.6 14.5 6.950 70.5 74.0 3.500 
Comoros 350 51.1 .. ..   35.2 80.1 44.900 
Yemen 270 47.0 8.6 26.7 18.110 25.4 72.2 46.800 
Lesotho 490 89.4 21.9 19.0 -2.930 59.0 73.5 14.500 
Togo 450 91.5 16.1 40.3 24.170 80.6 81.3 0.700 
Haiti 380 42.0 22.4 35.2 12.780 60.9 71.0 10.100 
Rwanda 320 33.6 8.0 8.8 0.830 86.4 85.3 -1.100 
Uganda 360 
126.
6 22.9 33.5 10.639 75.8 79.2 3.400 
Benin 340 90.2 11.3 27.0 15.770 67.6 78.3 10.700 
Sudan 360 84.0 12.1 18.2 6.140 31.3 76.0 44.700 
Djibouti 230 18.6 .. ..   36.3 67.7 31.400 
South Sudan 730 75.3 .. ..   .. ..   
Senegal 320 94.4 7.2 15.4 8.248 66.0 88.0 22.000 
Afghanistan 400 86.8 5.9 29.8 23.910 15.8 79.5 63.700 
Côte d'Ivoire 720 
130.
3 14.0 30.1 16.090 52.4 81.4 29.000 
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Malawi 510 
144.
8 11.1 21.6 10.480 84.6 81.5 -3.100 
Ethiopia 420 78.4 7.8 18.2 10.447 78.2 89.3 11.100 
Gambia 430 
115.
8 17.4 31.5 14.100 72.2 82.9 10.700 
Dem. Rep. Congo 730 
135.
3 12.8 32.4 19.640 70.7 73.2 2.500 
Liberia 640 
117.
4 15.4 39.3 23.940 58.2 64.8 6.600 
Guinea-Bissau 560 99.3 .. ..   68.2 78.5 10.300 
Mali 550 
175.
6 7.7 15.1 7.365 50.8 81.4 30.600 
Mozambique 480 
137.
8 1.4 6.2 4.800 85.5 82.8 -2.700 
Sierra Leone 
1,10
0 
100.
7 10.0 21.7 11.790 65.7 69.0 3.300 
Guinea 650 
131.
0 .. ..   65.6 78.3 12.700 
Burkina Faso 400 
115.
4 0.9 3.2 2.322 77.1 90.0 12.900 
Burundi 740 30.3 5.3 8.3 3.050 83.3 82.0 -1.300 
Chad 980 
152.
0 1.7 9.9 8.197 64.0 79.2 15.200 
Eritrea 380 65.3 .. ..   80.0 89.8 9.800 
Central African 
Republic 880 98.3 10.1 26.7 16.610 72.6 85.1 12.500 
Niger 630 
204.
8 2.4 7.8 5.330 40.0 89.7 49.700 
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Country MMR Z-Score ABR Z-Score ED Z-Score 
LFPRD Z-
Score Enright Index 
% 
Female 
Parliam
ent 
Seats 
2014 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
Norway -0.736709817 -1.011396111 -0.739050851 -0.950527282 -0.859421015 39.6 97,226 
Australia -0.727424984 -0.908774073 -0.617833982 -0.585703378 -0.709934104 30.5 51,296 
Switzerland -0.727424984 -1.15552846 -0.463308447 -0.579070332 -0.731333055 28.5 85,374 
Denmark -0.7320674 -1.077778603 -0.532974201 -0.937260672 -0.820020219 38.0 61,294 
Netherlands -0.727424984 -1.051934852 -0.309032201 -0.645402109 -0.683448536 36.9 52,129 
Germany -0.722782567 -1.10950035 -0.567366076 -0.598969743 -0.749654684 36.9 47,966 
Ireland -0.713497733 -1.001631837 -0.909180412 -0.453040587 -0.769337642 19.9 53,648 
United States -0.625291814 -0.448687294 -0.703213855 -0.612236094 -0.597357264 19.4 54,306 
Canada -0.7042129 -0.849508328 -0.661391371 -0.824497027 -0.759902406 28.2 50,169 
New Zealand -0.71814015 -0.586941647 -0.615761207 -0.665301261 -0.646536066 31.4 44,189 
Singapore -0.727424984 -1.054849561 0.2125315 -0.227513555 -0.44931415 25.3 55,910 
Hong Kong, China 
(SAR)   -1.121839284 0.219464794 -0.353543041 -0.313979383 .. 40,252 
Liechtenstein           20.0 157,040 
Sweden -0.736709817 -1.043117858 -0.57005132 -0.943893719 -0.823443178 43.6 58,856 
United Kingdom -0.71814015 -0.576035778 -0.651531135 -0.585703896 -0.63285274 23.5 46,461 
Iceland -0.736709817 -0.922643229 -0.58796812 -0.990325839 -0.809411751 41.3 52,048 
Korea (Republic 
of) -0.629934231 -1.14722154 0.865192553 0.011280087 -0.225170783 16.3 28,166 
Israel -0.745994651 -1.01176045 -0.295760364 -0.705100581 -0.689654011 22.5 38,500 
Luxembourg -0.7042129 -0.998887153 -0.661391371 -0.526005417 -0.72262421 28.3 116,560 
Japan -0.727424984 -1.07022465 -0.802845008 -0.01525237 -0.653936753 11.6 36,298 
Belgium -0.727424984 -1.038721506 0.019095237 -0.66530152 -0.603088193 42.4 47,348 
France -0.699570483 -1.062354936 -0.003958379 -0.724999992 -0.622720947 25.7 42,802 
Austria -0.736709817 -1.101460612 -0.66138884 -0.579070591 -0.769657465 30.3 51,296 
Finland -0.736709817 -0.977949828 -0.661390106 -0.897461857 -0.818377902 42.5 49,678 
Slovenia -0.722782567 -1.186691554 -0.376621384 -0.724999733 -0.75277381 27.7 23,954 
Spain -0.736709817 -0.943629132 0.143545281 -0.565803974 -0.52564941 38.0 29,861 
Italy -0.736709817 -1.105565494 0.514443011 -0.128016016 -0.363962079 30.1 35,812 
Czech Republic -0.7320674 -1.082515005 -0.677478791 -0.307110927 -0.699793031 18.9 19,470 
Greece -0.7320674 -0.913631921 0.286336478 -0.234146608 -0.398377363 21.0 21,414 
Estonia -0.7042129 -0.794128862 -0.661390106 -0.605603048 -0.691333729 19.8 20,122 
Brunei 
Darussalam -0.629934231 -0.643268394 -0.166606714 0.057712459 -0.34552422 .. 40,979 
Cyprus -0.708855316 -1.068743006 0.058729791 -0.446407534 -0.541319016 12.5 26,147 
Qatar -0.727424984 -0.970395874 -1.627469231 1.517005754 -0.452071084 0.0 97,519 
Andorra     -0.679742647     50.0 45,033 
Slovakia -0.722782567 -0.816159202 -0.606233779 -0.287211775 -0.608096831 18.7 18,486 
Poland -0.741352234 -0.906418017 0.110149301 -0.386709062 -0.481082503 22.1 14,111 
Lithuania -0.7042129 -0.943920603 -0.000270914 -0.685200666 -0.583401271 23.4 16,591 
Malta -0.713497733 -0.759783877 0.56105768 0.435801952 -0.119105494 13.0 25,222 
Saudi Arabia -0.681000816 -0.953417696 0.580765497 2.405848287 0.338048818 19.9 24,362 
Argentina -0.434952725 0.118539321 -0.49941498 0.376103474 -0.109931228 36.8 12,645 
United Arab 
Emirates -0.71814015 -0.530687768 -2.16345631 1.570070921 -0.460553327 17.5 43,963 
  
	  
120 
Chile -0.653146315 0.141152603 -0.269548233 0.250073729 -0.132867054 15.8 14,528 
Portugal -0.71814015 -0.896289404 -0.595582649 -0.698467534 -0.727119934 31.3 22,122 
Hungary -0.690285649 -0.907122405 -0.55619865 -0.439774229 -0.648345233 10.1 13,989 
Bahrain -0.653146315 -0.866850846 -1.33080293 1.716000322 -0.283699942 15.0 24,854 
Latvia -0.694928066 -0.873238916 -0.656199309 -0.605603293 -0.707492396 18.0 15,726 
Croatia -0.694928066 -0.892330258 0.430105853 -0.539271523 -0.424105999 25.8 13,425 
Kuwait -0.690285649 -0.85009127 -0.579869797 1.172081772 -0.237041236 1.5 43,600 
Montenegro -0.722782567 -0.832481571 0.667796757 -0.499472708 -0.346735022 17.3 7,337 
Belarus -0.750637068 -0.701343966 -0.001741345 -0.585703637 -0.509856504 30.1 8,014 
Russian 
Federation -0.643861481 -0.576788745 -0.291689474 -0.479573303 -0.497978251 14.5 12,898 
Oman -0.7042129 -0.943847735 0.5969048 2.107356173 0.264050085 9.6 19,310 
Romania -0.60207973 -0.449804599 0.096252341 -0.373442711 -0.332268675 12.0 10,129 
Uruguay -0.690285649 0.21472471 -1.180691217 -0.041784828 -0.424509246 11.5 16,807 
Bahamas -0.583510063 -0.510333385 -1.114673699 -0.784698212 -0.748303839 16.7 22,217 
Kazakhstan -0.634576647 -0.474312442 -0.218489371 -0.771431601 -0.524702516 20.1 12,436 
Barbados -0.513873811 -0.026394573 -0.891698488 -0.738266343 -0.542558303 19.6 15,360 
Antigua and 
Barbuda   -0.005117199       25.7 13,731 
Bulgaria -0.7320674 -0.330738746 -0.318302746 -0.711733634 -0.523210632 20.4 7,876 
Palau           10.3 11,068 
Panama -0.360674056 0.70578027 -1.184754515 0.727660761 -0.027996885 19.3 12,712 
Malaysia -0.620649397 -1.06381229 0.124572679 0.614896864 -0.236248036 14.2 10,933 
Mauritius -0.416383058 -0.451189086 0.428048263 0.581731095 0.035551803 11.6 9,945 
Seychelles   0.164713166 -0.700337531     43.8 15,759 
Trinidad and 
Tobago -0.365316473 -0.356291027 -0.514600148 0.044445849 -0.29794045 24.7 20,723 
Serbia -0.681000816 -0.791869962 1.253912607 -0.360176353 -0.144783631 34.0 6,155 
Cuba -0.38388614 -0.155176122 -0.097008027 0.316405002 -0.079916322 48.9 7,274 
Lebanon -0.681000816 -0.910741502 -0.3622714 1.709367276 -0.06116161 3.1 8,844 
Costa Rica -0.578867646 0.274962025 -0.696565282 0.701128045 -0.074835715 33.3 10,415 
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) -0.648503898 -0.43379799 0.028732757 2.332883331 0.31982855 3.1 5,443 
Venezuela -0.244613636 0.819721093 -1.383951018 0.415902282 -0.09823532 17.0 16,615 
Turkey -0.662431148 -0.450581855 1.999782753 1.298111902 0.546220413 14.4 10,299 
Sri Lanka -0.620649397 -0.791238442 -0.199507911 1.28484567 -0.08163752 5.8 3,635 
Mexico -0.527801061 0.338016891 -0.030422331 0.860323804 0.160029326 37.1 10,326 
Brazil -0.434952725 0.517854422 -0.941870283 -0.028518722 -0.221871827 9.6 11,387 
Georgia -0.564940395 -0.064965885 -0.281473652 -0.214247197 -0.281406782 11.3 4,097 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis           6.7 15,510 
Azerbaijan -0.634576647 -0.230108426 -0.196353193 -1.003592443 -0.516157677 15.6 7,808 
Grenada -0.648503898 -0.342859077       25.0 8,313 
Jordan -0.523158644 -0.558668972 0.479829685 1.934894182 0.333224063 11.6 4,831 
Macedonia -0.722782567 -0.758253655 1.292555064 0.170475846 -0.004501328 33.3 5,453 
Ukraine -0.648503898 -0.578148942 -0.133705517 -0.539271523 -0.47490747 11.8 2,929 
Algeria -0.342104389 -0.957984073 -0.109662334 2.332883265 0.230783117 25.7 5,484 
Peru -0.342104389 0.030952322 0.575603806 -0.373442452 -0.027247678 22.3 6,516 
Albania -0.657788731 -0.830125515 0.109020536 -0.081584147 -0.365119464 20.7 4,642 
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Armenia -0.620649397 -0.543002412 -0.538643331 -0.227513555 -0.482452174 10.7 3,622 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -0.71814015 -0.834716181 2.491029266 0.090877963 0.257262724 19.3 4,844 
Ecuador -0.351389222 0.669370699 -0.753880433 0.409268977 -0.006657495 41.6 6,346 
Saint Lucia -0.597437313 0.166024784   -0.552538133   20.7 7,655 
China -0.606722147 -0.993980726 1.010131185 -0.492839396 -0.270852771 23.6 7,617 
Fiji -0.481376893 -0.160956961 -0.624692616 0.840424148 -0.106650581 14.0 5,112 
Mongolia -0.439595142 -0.747323497 -0.812212991 -0.605602789 -0.651183605 14.9 4,147 
Thailand -0.634576647 -0.205722029 -0.014937256 -0.360176864 -0.303853199 6.1 5,977 
Dominica     -1.484734978     21.9 7,361 
Libya -0.685643232 -1.140396263 -2.381110385 1.629769393 -0.644345122 16.0 6,602 
Tunisia -0.541728311 -1.089898934 1.019124601 1.589970452 0.244366952 31.3 4,261 
Colombia -0.36995889 0.463033608 -0.826551586 0.137309832 -0.149041759 20.9 7,904 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines -0.546370728 0.122279864   0.031179491   13.0 6,669 
Jamaica -0.38388614 0.499953252 -1.135926607 -0.466306693 -0.371541547 16.7 5,004 
Tonga -0.198189468 -0.761799884 -0.564353086 -0.048418385 -0.393190206 0.0 4,122 
Belize -0.546370728 0.532452255 -0.73976582 0.747560166 -0.001531032 13.3 4,831 
Dominican 
Republic -0.291037804 1.21723879 -0.973679413 0.362837122 0.078839674 19.1 6,147 
Suriname -0.1517653 -0.346745355 -0.341781547 0.429168899 -0.102780826 11.8 9,680 
Maldives -0.611364563 -1.100221861 0.01055358 -0.035152034 -0.43404622 5.9 8,484 
Samoa -0.48601931 -0.515482704 -1.212663588 0.866956857 -0.336802186 6.1 4,294 
Botswana 0.033931372 -0.127486388 -0.126112933 -0.804597868 -0.256066454 9.5 7,123 
Moldova (Republic 
of) -0.657788731 -0.490780547 -0.284277846 -1.010225243 -0.610768092 20.8 1,951 
Egypt -0.546370728 -0.15809083 1.458206266 1.941527613 0.67381808 2.2 3,151 
Turkmenistan -0.472092059 -0.7644717   0.541932286   25.8 9,032 
Gabon 0.358900549 1.29999223 -2.910060405 -0.837763385 -0.522232753 16.2 10,317 
Indonesia 0.126779708 -0.027827638 0.522482292 0.72766025 0.337273653 17.1 3,492 
Paraguay -0.244613636 0.424802344 0.116849756 0.482234066 0.194818133 16.8 4,729 
Palestine, State of   -0.088356423 0.029883033 1.934894434   .. 2,811 
Uzbekistan -0.588152479 -0.260372819   0.376103474   16.4 2,139 
Philippines -0.198189468 -0.065305935 -0.938519422 0.449068045 -0.188236695 27.1 2,871 
El Salvador -0.434952725 0.64379413 0.193279238 0.621530169 0.255912703 27.4 4,120 
South Africa -0.105341132 0.033721296 -0.256396613 -0.386709062 -0.178681378 40.7 6,482 
Viet Nam -0.527801061 -0.496294204 0.829183458 -0.837763637 -0.258168861 24.3 2,015 
Bolivia 0.173203876 0.544208247 0.794060164 -0.34027669 0.292798899 51.8 3,124 
Kyrgyzstan -0.407098224 -0.490877704 -0.366928185 0.110777374 -0.288531685 23.3 1,267 
Iraq -0.444237559 0.466191209 2.182032609 2.193587487 1.099393437 26.5 6,391 
Cabo Verde -0.509231394 0.513045152   0.687861435   20.8 3,609 
Micronesia  -0.309607471 -0.750966883       0.0 2,960 
Guyana 0.405324717 0.947531073 -2.246974735 1.065951432 0.042958122 31.3 4,040 
Nicaragua -0.291037804 1.246580192 -0.805649202 0.734293814 0.22104675 39.1 1,963 
Morocco -0.198189468 -0.331661737 0.545830753 1.822130921 0.459527617 11.0 3,243 
Namibia -0.1517653 0.132092717 -0.513334717 -0.851029736 -0.346009259 37.7 5,589 
Guatemala -0.105341132 1.159819028 -0.494301375 1.132282705 0.423114806 13.3 3,673 
Tajikistan -0.551013145 -0.161807084 -1.148580913 -0.240779907 -0.525545262 15.2 1,114 
India 0.126779708 -0.405015241 3.081753814 2.060924305 1.216110647 12.2 1,586 
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Honduras -0.198189468 0.837743709 -0.929795543 1.21188084 0.230409884 25.8 2,449 
Bhutan -0.198189468 -0.207543722 -0.591662345 -0.751532449 -0.437231996 8.3 2,569 
Timor-Leste 0.498173053 0.066341745   0.289872412   38.5 4,294 
Syrian Arab 
Republic -0.527801061 -0.191221353 0.728052769 2.478812606 0.62196074 12.4 1,821 
Vanuatu -0.356031639 -0.113252894   -0.22088025   0.0 3,138 
Congo 1.148111405 1.876375889 0.258577991 -1.149521598 0.533385922 11.5 3,125 
Kiribati -0.1517653 -0.798306611       8.7 1,358 
Equatorial Guinea 0.591021389 1.534261947   -0.685200924 0.360020603 19.7 20,382 
Zambia 0.544597221 1.844241225 1.634101129 -0.618869399 0.851017544 12.7 1,715 
Ghana 1.008838901 0.216716428 1.801684643 -1.176054314 0.462796414 10.9 1,388 
Laos   0.37799698 1.127928861 -1.262285496   25.0 1,756 
Bangladesh 0.033931372 0.755767525 0.25604713 0.323038055 0.34219602 20.0 1,088 
Cambodia 0.033931372 -0.125008886 0.99379321 -0.937260924 -0.008636307 19.0 1,095 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 0.219628044 0.3802073   0.707761357   18.2 1,811 
Kenya 1.101687237 1.071989137 0.110317603 -0.77143186 0.378140529 20.8 1,358 
Nepal 0.126779708 0.588050325 1.937804489 -0.97042668 0.420551961 29.5 692 
Pakistan 0.033931372 -0.539504762 2.727763504 2.419114513 1.160326157 19.7 1,358 
Myanmar 0.173203876 -0.908798363 -1.631975429 -0.977059222 -0.836157284 4.7 1,244 
Angola 1.380232245 2.931281859   -0.545904569   36.8 6,054 
Swaziland 0.683869725 0.546807196 -0.137501809 0.38936958 0.370636173 14.7 3,532 
Tanzania  1.148111405 1.778830302 -0.162810422 -1.308717364 0.36385348 36.0 952 
Nigeria 1.844473926 1.70316932   -0.419874825   6.6 3,203 
Cameroon 1.98374643 1.611963225 1.048206729 -0.585703378 1.014553251 27.1 1,407 
Madagascar 1.287383909 1.782060771   -1.189320414   20.5 453 
Zimbabwe 1.426656413 0.261894414 1.021632685 -1.016858549 0.423331241 35.1 965 
Mauritania 0.730293893 0.578796124 0.934317968 1.895095241 1.034625807 22.2 1,283 
Solomon Islands -0.1517653 0.373673495   0.250073477   2.0 1,927 
Papua New 
Guinea 0.266052212 0.306853796 0.21808421 -1.215853123 -0.106215726 2.7 2,221 
Comoros 0.869566397 0.040109366   1.530271854 0.609986904 3.0 841 
Yemen 0.498173053 -0.059646542 1.630304837 1.656301725 0.931283268 0.7 1,418 
Lesotho 1.519504749 0.970508693 -1.032161292 -0.48620635 0.24291145 26.8 986 
Togo 1.333808077 1.021224626 2.397155822 -1.401581088 0.837651859 17.6 643 
Haiti 1.008838901 -0.182428649 0.95583029 -0.778065159 0.251043846 3.5 813 
Rwanda 0.730293893 -0.385170933 -0.55635936 -1.520978031 -0.433053608 57.5 697 
Uganda 0.915990565 1.874505617 0.684848435 -1.222486687 0.563214483 35.0 727 
Benin 0.823142229 0.989697193 1.33419406 -0.738265839 0.602191911 8.4 903 
Sudan 0.915990565 0.837792287 0.115584325 1.517005754 0.846593233 23.8 2,081 
Djibouti 0.31247638 -0.749363793   0.634796268   12.7 1,814 
South Sudan 2.633684782 0.626961687       24.3 924 
Senegal 0.730293893 1.091323372 0.382368746 0.011280087 0.553816524 42.7 1,067 
Afghanistan 1.101687237 0.907696719 2.364254625 2.777304661 1.787735811 27.6 668 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.587260614 1.962141194 1.374687841 0.475600761 1.599922603 9.2 1,546 
Malawi 1.612353085 2.315768235 0.664781236 -1.653641088 0.734815367 16.7 343 
Ethiopia 1.194535573 0.701869702 0.660626827 -0.711733123 0.461324745 25.5 553 
Gambia 1.240959741 1.611647465 1.122867138 -0.738265839 0.809302126 9.4 441 
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Dem. Rep. Congo 2.633684782 2.084656119 1.823915729 -1.282184648 1.315017996 8.2 3,125 
Liberia 2.21586727 1.650485959 2.368050917 -1.010225243 1.306044726 10.7 483 
Guinea-Bissau 1.844473926 1.210656406   -0.764798548   13.7 672 
Mali 1.798049758 3.063002406 0.270647669 0.581731353 1.428357796 9.5 701 
Mozambique 1.473080581 2.144286203 -0.053983384 -1.627108372 0.484068757 39.6 628 
Sierra Leone 4.351379 1.243884086 0.830552654 -1.229119222 1.299174129 12.4 755 
Guinea 2.262291438 1.980066653 -0.661390106 -0.605602789 0.743841299 21.9 536 
Burkina Faso 1.101687237 1.601494563 -0.367506487 -0.59233669 0.435834656 13.3 725 
Burundi 2.68010895 -0.466782778 -0.275433752 -1.534244648 0.100911943 34.9 265 
Chad 3.794288983 2.490650761 0.375925173 -0.439774488 1.555272608 14.9 941 
Eritrea 1.008838901 0.383923554   -0.797964311   22.0 755 
Central African 
Republic 3.330047303 1.186780084 1.440490236 -0.618869399 1.334612056 12.5 383 
Niger 2.169443102 3.772491099 0.013084441 1.84866312 1.95092044 13.3 427 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Bills Introduced by Bolivian Female Politicians Between 1997 and 2002 
  
 This dataset, included in Jimena Costa Benavides’ article, “Women’s Political 
Participation in Bolivia,”186 displays the types of bills sponsored by Bolivian female politicians 
in the years immediately following quota implementation.  Bills introduced by female politicians 
were coded by topic.  As we can see, Gender-Specific Issues only accounted for 11% of the 
female-introduced legislation in the Congress, and there were no Gender-Specific Issues bills 
introduced by women between 1997 and 2002. This is fairly limited sample, but it does fit within 
the findings of this paper.  An increase in critical mass does not necessitate pro-woman political 
reform.   More recent analysis of bill introduction could shed further light on this phenomenon. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  "Women’s Political Participation in Bolivia: Progress and Obstacles."  
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